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ABSTRACT
A large amount of research examines the eect of partisan polarization on the insti-
tution of Congress, yet we know remarkably little about this political phenomenon's
precise eect on the political behavior of the American electorate. Some scholars ar-
gue that polarization is healthy for democracy because it allows political elites to send
clear cues to the mass public, but other scholars postulate that polarization is bad for
democracy. Decades of research on voter turnout resulted in a vast accumulation of
knowledge on the subject. However, scholars must pay greater attention to data col-
lection and measurement strategies because the prevalent technique to quantify voter
turnout articially deates participation rates. I take two paths to uncover the eects
of partisanship on the decision to vote. From the micro perspective, I utilize a variety
of partisanship measures based on survey data. From the aggregate perspective, I ar-
gue that calculating voter turnout based on the voting eligible population (VEP) is a
superior measurement strategy to other techniques. I adoopt a VEP measure of voter
turnout for state-wide races (1994-2010). The results suggest that polarization is an
important factor that increases voter turnout at both the individual and aggregate
levels.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Political participation lies at the heart of democracy because representative democ-
racy is unthinkable without the ability of citizens to freely inuence the direction of
their government. Opportunities to inuence democratic governments may take many
forms, but arguably, no single act is more important than voting. Through elections,
citizens align with other like-minded individuals to make their preferences known.
They indicate their selection for government ocials, and they attempt to inuence
the direction of public policy. Additionally, elections provide a punishment-reward
mechanism where citizens may reward a legislator for achieving a collective good
as dened by the constituency, or they may remove the incumbent from oce for
straying too far from the state or district's preferred goals.
Even though elections are an important part of representative democracy, partici-
pation varies greatly from country to country. Many European nations see high rates
of voter turnout due to compulsory voting laws, but other nations, particularly the
United States, sees much lower levels of voter turnout even considering our nation's
established tradition as a representative democracy. For many Americans, voting is
the only form of political participation, but many citizens choose to abstain from the
process entirely. This feature of American politics is especially puzzling considering
the relatively high levels of education in the United States (Powell, 1986). This feature
of American politics is what Brody (1978) identied as the, \puzzle of participation."
Many factors are thought to inuence whether a citizen decides to vote. For in-
stance, class and social associations (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944; Berelson et al., 1954),
strength of partisan and ideological identication (Campbell et al., 1960), possessing
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a vast accumulation of political resources (Verba et al., 1995), and high levels of socio-
economic status (Wolnger and Rosenstone, 1980) are some of the most important
factors that encourage an individual to show-up on election day. Other factors that
discourage electoral participation include but are not limited to registration require-
ments (Rosenstone and Wolnger, 1978), residential relocation (Squire et al., 1987),
economic hardship (Rosenstone, 1982), and the structural arrangement of American
institutions (Hill, 2006).
Of the factors that inuence electoral decision-making, scholars continue to demon-
strate the importance of partisanship. Since the 1960s, many empirical studies but-
tressed the original ndings found in The American Voter and demonstrated the in-
creased reliance on partisanship for electoral decision-making (Converse and Markus,
1979; Green et al., 2002; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008; Miller and Shanks, 1996). In fact, a
few scholars (Lau and Redlawsk, 2001, 2006; Popkin, 1994) indicate that voters base
their electoral choices on partisanship rather than becoming fully informed about spe-
cic policies and candidates. Hetherington (2001) notes that reliance on partisanship
is as high as it as ever been for presidential elections, and we are nearly replicating
an all-time high found in the 1950s for congressional elections.
1.1 Polarization in American Politics
Most observers of American politics admit that there is a sharp division between
Democrats and Republicans at just about every level of government. In today's
Congress, members rarely cross the aisle to work with members of the opposition
party. Voting along strict party lines is the norm rather than the exception, and
ideological moderates among both parties increasingly face extinction (Fleisher and
Bond, 2004). In terms of partisan ideology, Democratic members gravitate toward the
liberal end of the spectrum, and Republican members tack towards the conservative
2
poll (Abramowitz and Saunders, 1998). The two congressional parties now display
more dierences than they do commonalities (Lowry and Shipan, 2002). Acrimony
characterizes the institutional atmosphere within Congress because derision denes
inter-party dierences.
This institutional arrangement is what is known as partisan or ideological po-
larization. This phenomenon clearly aect the legislative process within Congress,
but the precise impact of polarization on the electorate is unclear. Aldrich (1995)
famously stated that political parties are endogenous institutions, meaning that the
actors within parties determine how they behave and how the public perceives them.
This line of logic applies to Congress as well because legislators are one of the primary
vehicles that directs the course of the nation's public policies. As a result, individual
legislator behavior, as well as the aggregate-level behavior between the two parties,
directly inuences the American public's perception of Congress (Durr et al., 1997;
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 1995; Kimball and Patterson, 1997), which should have a
direct impact on the voting behavior of the electorate.
Most scholars admit that partisan polarization is an undeniable feature of Amer-
ican politics, but they often disagree over how deep the partisan divide runs. One
school of thought (Ahuja, 2008; Fiorina et al., 2006; Fiorina and Abrams, 2009) pos-
tulates that partisan polarization is limited to the politically active class, and while
many voters may think of themselves as Democratic or as Republican, the policy or
ideological preferences of the mass public does not reect stark divisions found among
political elites. Instead, this line of thought stresses that the American electorate has
simply sorted into groups of like-minded individuals, but there is still a great deal
of overlapping policy or ideological cleavages within the mass public, meaning that
moderates primarily comprise the American electorate.
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The other perspective (Abramowitz, 2010; Jacobson, 2009) suggests that the divi-
sion between Democrats and Republicans is not an elite-level phenomenon, and that
the sharp partisan divisions found at the elite-level do extend to the mass public. Ac-
cording to this argument, political engagement is an important intervening variable
that inuences opinion and electoral behavior. Politically sophisticated Americans
{ citizens who express a great deal of interest in politics and are very knowledge-
able about political events { are especially likely to mimic elite-level polarization in
their ideological positions and policy preferences, all else equal. This portion of the
electorate almost always votes for their party's candidates, and they vehemently de-
fend the policy prescriptions stated in their party's platform. The division between
Democrats and Republicans with average political sophistication also exists, but the
partisan divide for these individuals is slightly less pronounced than it is for sophis-
ticated individuals in the American electorate.
Addressing whether polarization extends into the electorate is a dicult endeavor
to undertake because scholars have put forth compelling evidence on both sides of the
argument. From a theoretical standpoint, the argument that polarization is conned
to the elite class is appealing because this means that most Americans are moderates
who have a great deal of common ground ideologically. However, this line of thought
also suggests that there is something very dierent about people who serve in oce
or who serve as a formal part of the party apparatus. There is considerable dierence
between the preferences of these elected ocials, which leads to a severe crisis in
representation because our leaders are out of touch with the average voter's prefer-
ences. In other words, the legislator-constituent dyad has broken down, and policy
congruence between constituents and elected ocials is only a reality in theoretical
discussions.
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From a practical standpoint, this perspective of polarization is frightening. A
breakdown in representation constitutes a threat to the American commitment to
republican democracy. If elected ocials pursue their own wishes at the expense
of their constituents without repercussions, then such a process is likely to increase
cynicism about the political system, which should decrease the likelihood that citizens
will participate electorally. Thus, the process becomes a vicious cycle where mistrust
and cynicism decreases the likelihood of voting, and deated turnout rates leads to a
further breakdown of policy congruence and, ultimately, representation.
However, if polarization does extend into the mass electorate, then this is a com-
pletely dierent story of representation { one that is both theoretically and norma-
tively appealing. If the more sophisticated portion of the electorate displays similar
levels of polarization to elected ocials, then at least some portion of the electorate
experiences policy congruence and eective representation. Other Americans who are
less active and less engaged will not experience the same level of policy congruence
as citizens whose preferences coincide with elites, but they at least have some of their
concerns addressed.
As with the previous perspective, the relationship between polarization and elec-
toral participation is tautological, but the covariation between these two concepts is
very dierent according to this description. If representatives and active citizens in
the electorate share similar views, then this should reduce cynicism about government
because voters are getting some of what they want. According to this assessment, po-
larization should energize the electorate by giving citizens an opportunity to choose
representatives who share similar views, which should, in turn, increase the likelihood
of participating in electoral politics, ceteris paribus.
Aside from a representation perspective, polarization should encourage individuals
to vote because it injects a moral component into electoral politics because each side
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invokes moral superiority to implement their policy platforms. As personal morality
becomes a dening component of policy debate, hostility between Democratic and
Republican candidates increases, and each party wants their policy implemented with
no concession to the other side. Consequently, personal morality and party loyalty
are more important than acknowledging competing ideals through robust democratic
debate. Candidates and their supporters consistently try to obfuscate their opponent's
messages and policy positions in order to win oce because they feel the other side's
platform portends destruction for the country.
1.2 Polarization and Voter Turnout
Two schools of thought can help explain how polarization relates to voter turnout.
The Michigan model (Campbell et al., 1960) suggests that just about everything
comes down to partisanship. The activity of political elites or things such as political
events in the news have very little sway over our political activity or decision-making
because our political behavior is relatively stable. In other words, the Michigan model
suggests that polarization has very little eect on voter turnout because our partisan
predispositions drive our political behavior.
The other school of though (Claassen and Highton, 2009; Levendusky, 2010; Zaller,
1992) suggest that voters are very much inueced by the political activity of political
elites. According to elite discourse theory, the opinions that voters hold are a di-
rect function of the political information that is transmitted through elite discourse.
Partisanship only serves as guide to either accept or reject that information.
I argue that a model of voter turnout should utilize both of these perspectives.
Polarization is not just an elite-level phenomenon. Polarization should energize the
electorate because it allows voters to clearly interpret messages from political elites,
which reduces the costs of participation and increases the reliance on party images
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(Brewer and Stonecash, 2009; Trilling, 1978). An increased emphasis on partisan-
ship with a lower participation cost should encourage electoral participation at the
individual and aggregate levels.
However, the eect of polarization should not produce the same eect on all seg-
ments of the American electorate. Political sophistication conditions the degree to
which voters behave in a partisan manner. In other words, polarization increases the
likelihood of voting for those who are paying attention to politics. Politically sophis-
ticated voters already pay a great deal of attention to what their elected ocials are
doing, so polarization likely just reinforces the partisan tendencies that these voters
already have. This means that polarization should have the most pronounced eect
on the behavior of moderately aware voters. In other words, polarization encourages
moderately aware individuals to mimic the behavior of the most active segments of
the American electorate. I expect polarization has a minimal eect on voters with
low political sophistication.
1.3 Measuring Turnout and Polarization
As with many other empirical debates in the social sciences, the conclusions oered
by scholars to explain political phenomena often reect the underlying operational
denitions and measurement strategies of the concept at hand. Empirical studies
of voter turnout and polarization are no exception to this evaluation. Additionally,
dierent types of research design and their corresponding levels of analysis can reveal
dierent things about the nature of congressional elections. As a result, I make use
of both individual-level and aggregate-level analyses in order to triangulate the the
precise relationship between polarization and voter turnout. In this section, I identify
my operational denitions of voter turnout and polarization, and I indicate how I
intend to measure each of these concepts in the forthcoming analyses.
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1.3.1 Measuring Turnout
The turnout literature demonstrates the importance of correctly measuring par-
ticipation because debate exists as to whether turnout is on the decline or on the
rise in the United States. A few scholars (Patterson, 2002; Teixeria, 1992; Watten-
burg, 2002) argue that participation in modern American elections is on precipitous
decline when compared to the 1950s. This view of American turnout is popular in
the literature, and scholars have oered a variety of explanations to account for this
occurrence. For example, the lack of social capital (Putnam, 2000), generational re-
placement (Miller and Shanks, 1996), negative advertising (Ansolabehere and Iyengar,
1995), cable television (Baum and Kernell, 1999), selective mobilization (Rosenstone
and Hansen, 1993), diminishing partisan attachment (Abramson and Aldrich, 1982),
and the prevalence of divided government (Franklin and Hirczy de Mino, 1998) are
some of the various factors thought to depress voter turnout.
Scholars who argue that electoral participation is on the decline typically esti-
mate voter turnout by dividing the total number of ballots cast by the number in
the population over the age of 18. This measure is known as the voting-aged popula-
tion measure (VAP). However, measuring turnout in this manner proves problematic
because it conceals true participation rates and articially reports downward voting
trends. Burden (2000, 2003) rst noticed a discrepancy between VAP estimates and
self-reported turnout rates in the American National Election Survey (ANES), which
he attributed to respondent over-reporting. Martinez (2003) suggests that the dier-
ence between the VAP and the ANES measure was largely due to sample selection
rather than over-reporting because the ANES did not include non-citizens in their
sample.
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Dierent measurement strategies such as the the voting eligible population (VEP)
measure remove people who are ineligible to vote { non-citizen residents and felons
{ from the calculation (McDonald and Popkin, 2001; McDonald, 2002, 2010, 2011).
The VEP measure demonstrates stability in turnout rates since the 1950s and an
upward trend in the past few national elections. The VEP measure is much closer
to the turnout rates reported in ANES than is the VAP calculation (McDonald,
2003). There is still a small gap between the VEP and the self-reported measure, but
the gap is stable. Holbrook and Heidbreder (2010) demonstrate that VEP measure
performs much better than the VAP for both national and state elections, and that
this alternative measurement strategy changes what types of inferences scholars can
make about the American electorate, particularly that the declining turnout rate is
incorrect.
I adopt the VEP measure of turnout because of its widespread acceptance in the
voting behavior literature. The VEP measure of turnout is vastly superior to other
techniques used to estimate aggregate-level participation. Properly measuring turnout
is important for my purposes because improperly measuring voter turnout is likely
to change the covariation between polarization and electoral participation. In order
to have a proper understanding of how these two variables operate in the aggregate,
I make use of the VEP measure of turnout in each state from 1994 through 2010.
In order to measure individual-level turnout, I utilize several dierent cross-sections
of survey data. Both the American National Election Survey (ANES) and the Co-
operative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) provide a variety of questions that
enable me to evaluate what encourages individuals to vote.
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1.3.2 Measuring Polarization
Many scholars conceptualize polarization as a strict manifestation of partisanship,
meaning that our aective attachment to partisan symbols or labels drives our po-
litical behavior. These scholars tend to place little or no emphasis on the role that
ideology plays for partisan dierentiation either among members of Congress or in-
dividuals within the electorate. Others place a great deal of emphasis on the role of
ideology, especially at the elite-level. However, the underlying process driving polar-
ization within the electorate is less clear, but, nonetheless important.
For studies of Congress, scholars typically assess polarization by quantifying ide-
ology or partisanship through roll-call votes, but no consensus exists as to which con-
ception produces greater inuence on the behavior of legislators. A wealth of research
(Krehbiel, 1998; Levitt, 1996; Lucas and Deutchman, 2007; Poole and Daniels, 1985;
Poole and Rosenthal, 1991, 2001, 2007; Cox and Poole, 2002; McCarty et al., 2001,
2006) stresses that legislator preferences and, more specically, ideology guide roll-
call voting decisions and that these preferences are stable over time. Others (Garand
and Clayton, 1986; Lee, 2009; Sinclair, 1981, 2006; Smith, 2007; Snyder and Grose-
close, 2000, 2001; Wright and Schaner, 2002) argue that partisanship guides voting
decisions for members of Congress.
This is an important debate within the congressional voting literature because
each perspective implies dierent things for members of Congress. If legislators use
their personal preferences to vote a certain way, then they are relatively free to sup-
port any proposal of their choice. However, if party is more important than personal
preferences, then the party apparatus considerably constrains their choices. Both of
the these perspectives are incredibly important for testing both institutional and
constituency-based theories of political behavior for the institution of Congress.
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In this dissertation, I argue that ideology structures the behavior of our elected
ocials because political elites { members of Congress and state legislators { have rst
hand information of public policy debates, and they have a rm understanding of what
types of issues coincide with their ideological positions. In other words, legislators
have a great deal of ideological constraint guiding their voting decisions. Following
(Poole and Rosenthal, 2007) and (Shor and McCarty, 2011), I adopt the spatial
model framework in order to form my measures of polarization. These measures of
ideology in Congress and state legislatures are widely accepted in the literature for
their validity and reliability. More importantly, the nature of these multi-dimensional
scaling technique allow for direct comparison of ideology and polarization across time,
which is important for my aggregate-level analyses.
Scholars have also spent a great deal of eort evaluating the use of partisanship and
ideology among the American electorate. In contrast to the study of these topics for
legislative chambers, the conclusions are incredibly lopsided. These studies question
the ability of the American public to incorporate ideological knowledge into their
political opinions, but they show that Americans depend greatly upon partisanship
(Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1964; Converse and Markus, 1979; Green et al.,
2002; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008; Miller and Shanks, 1996). Other research (Smith, 1980,
1989) suggests that the inability of Americans to use ideology may, at least partially,
be due to measurement problems. Jessee (2012) indicates that many Americans are
able to use ideology once they are placed on the same measurement scale as members
of Congress.
Elite discourse theory is agnostic as to whether citizens in the electorate are able to
incorporate ideological information into their opinions. This theory suggests that citi-
zens use elite information to inform their decision-making and that they either accept
or reject this information based on their predispositions and political sophistication,
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all else equal. It is possible that some individuals have the ability to incorporate ideo-
logical information into their opinions, but others simply notice the partisan processes
at play. Even among sections of the mass public who do not pay a great attention
to political detail, the use of ideological language to describe the party system is
widespread. In today's political landscape, people tend to think of Democrats and
the liberal party and Republicans as the conservative party. Most Americans are able
to correctly identify the polarity of the party system without great knowledge of the
various candidate for oce or specic policy debates.
I do not take a strong position as to whether the American electorate primarily
uses ideology or partisanship to guide their opinions and vote choice. It is possible
that some do, but others do not. Variables such as political sophistication and edu-
cation have a great deal of inuence as to which processes voters are able to use for
their decision-making. For the purposes of this dissertation, it does not really matter
whether ideology or partisanship inuences a voter's decision to participate electorally
because the behavior of political elites reinforces ideological or partisan divisions in
the electorate.
In order to form my individual-level measures of polarization, I make use of a
variety of cross-sectional survey data. The ANES has a great deal of information
about intention to vote and vote choice. Additionally, these surveys ask respondents
to evaluate parties, candidates, and policy proposals along an ideological scale, which
makes them well-suited for analyses of polarization and voter turnout.
1.4 Plan for the Dissertation
In the coming sections, I proceed as follows. In Chapter 2, I provide a detailed
discussion of how my theoretical expectations demonstrate the relationship between
polarization and voter turnout. Additionally in this chapter, I propose a few formal
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hypotheses. In Chapter 3, utilize a number of techniques in order to provide evidence
of polarization at both the individual and aggregate levels. Beginning with Chapter
4, I move to my empirical analyses by assessing levels of polarization over time for
individuals. In Chapter 5, I utilize the VEP measure of voter turnout to assess how
polarization inuence electoral participation in the aggregate. In Chapter 6, I provide
a discussion of my results, and I address the implications of my research.
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Chapter 2
POLARIZATION AND VOTER TURNOUT IN U.S. ELECTIONS
In the previous chapter, I described the current state of the literature pertaining to
polarization and voter turnout. Previous research has done an excellent job of de-
scribing how polarization aects the institutional mechanisms of Congress. However,
the theoretical link between polarization and the electorate is much less clear. In this
chapter, I lay down the theoretical foundation for the forthcoming analyses. Addi-
tionally, in this chapter I address a number of hypotheses related to polarization and
electoral behavior at both the individual and aggregate levels.
Zaller (1992) is famously remembered for saying that public opinion is a marriage
between predispositions and public discourse. In some ways, public opinion may be
a bit more complicated than that, but in many other ways, his assessment of public
opinion is spot on. His work went to great lengths to show that political elites have a
great deal of inuence over the opinions voters report that they have about political
issues. His work is largely about describing how voters form political opinions, how
those opinions change, and why people respond to political stimuli { in his case,
surveys { the way they do.
Since the publication of the American Voter, political scientists have known that
partisan identication is an important aspect of why people make the political deci-
sions that they do. In the tradition of that work and Zaller's work, it is safe to say
that partisanship is a perceptual lense that colors the way humans see the political
world. For those of us who strongly identify with party labels, it biases the political
decisions we make, it aects the policies and candidates that we support, and it ul-
timately aects the the types of information that we use to update our information
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banks. Strong partisans tend to be very attentive to politics, and they tend to pick
up more information from elite discourse than do other types of voters.
Generally speaking, Independent voters do not identify as strongly with a particu-
lar party label. In fact, they tend to completely avoid forming attachments with either
of the two major parties. Additionally, Independent voters tend to be less interested
in politics than their strong partisan counterparts. This generally means that they
are less engaged with the political world, and as a result, they tend not to encounter
as many political messages contained through elite discourse.
Electoral competition naturally creates competing messaging frames, and due to
the structure of our two-party system, voters tend to hear two dominate message
frames from political elites most often transmitted through the news media. Each
party has a vested interest in establishing an image of itself to create a brand that
allows parties to present themselves to voters. The whole purpose of electoral com-
petition between political parties is convince voters that their brand is better and to
convince voters to cast a vote for their slate of candidates.
The work of Downs (1957) stresses the importance of the median voter. Downs'
theory suggests that we could think of the partisanship of the electorate as a normally
distributed probability distribution. Most voters are located at the center of the distri-
bution with rather moderate policies and looser attachment the party labels. However,
in a polarized environment, the distribution of voters becomes stretched towards the
ends of the spectrum. Fewer voters are located at the center of the distribution, mean-
ing the competition between the parties for the center of the electorate becomes more
erce.
Because evaluations of the political system depend on a number of factors voters
are very like to see the party system dierently from one another. Some voters are
likely to see a great deal of dierence between the two parties, yet others will report
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seeing no dierence between the two. This fact is likely to occur for a variety of reasons.
Some of these reasons include but are not limited to partisan attachment, interest in
politics, education, and other factors known to aect political behavior. Nevertheless,
as the ideological distance between the the two parties grows, the number of voters
who see no dierence between the two parties should decrease considerably.
As the number of messages from political elites increases and the content of such
messages becomes increasingly negative under a polarized environment, voters should
begin to evaluate the party system dierently. Voters should evaluate the party system
more frequently, and the content of these evaluations should change. Considering this
aspect of polarization and political behavior, I propose two formal hypotheses:
Evaluation Frequency Hypothesis : Voters who see higher levels of polarization between
the two parties will provide a greater number of comments about the two
parties when asked their opinions about them in surveys or interviews.
Aective Evaluation Hypothesis : Voters who see higher levels of polarization between
the two parties will provide stronger opinions about each of the two parties.
Strong partisans will provide more positive evaluations of their party and more
negative evaluations of the competing party.
As the number of political messages from political elites increases, strong partisans
should be the most likely to receive and accept political content. This should reinforce
their already well-established habit of voting. However, as the intensity of political
messages increases from political elites, independent voters should also be more likely
to receive the content form political elites. As result, the likelihood of voting should
increase for all types of partisans, but the most pronounced eect should be found
among independent voters. Considering this expectation, I propose an additional
hypothesis:
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Voter Turnout Hypothesis : Voters who see higher levels of polarization will have a
higher probability of voting than will voters who see lower levels of polarization
between the two parties.
Voter turnout at the macro-level is very dierent than individual-level turnout
because electorates are collections of individuals. However, because electorates are
collections of individuals, elite discourse should still predict greater turnout in the
aggregate. Rather than changing the probability that an individual voter will cast a
ballot, polarization will produce a higher overall turnout rate in a particular state or
congressional district. Considering this expectation, I propose a nal hypothesis:
Macro Turnout Hypothesis : States that display higher levels of polarization will have
higher rates of voter turnout than will states who have lower levels of polar-
ization.
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Chapter 3
EVIDENCE OF POLARIZATION
In this chapter, I assess levels of polarization for both the voters and elected ocials.
The the data used to evaluate polarization among voters comes from the American
National Election Survey (ANES). Several variables contained in this survey prove
incredibly useful for assessing levels of polarization among the electorate. For instance,
I make use of partisanship self-placement, the ideological self-placement, ideological
placement of the parties, feeling thermometers, and issue scale variables to determine
whether the American electorate is polarized.
Researchers administer the ANES during presidential election years and almost all
midterm election years with the exception of the 2006 and 2010. During presidential
election years, the survey is administered in a pre-election wave and a post-election
wave. Non-presidential years typically contain a post-election survey only. Each year of
the ANES is a nationally representative cross-section of the American electorate, but
many of the question contained in the various cross-sections of the ANES ask similar
questions, but many others also change over time. The questions that do remain the
same over time (or relatively similar over time) are published in the ANES cumulative
data le (CDF). This data le includes the 1948 - 2012 ANES cross-sections, but it
does not include many of the panel studies that are included in the year to year cross-
sections. In this chapter, I make use of three primary ANES datasets { the 1972 and
2012 cross-sections and the ANES CDF.
For members of Congress, I rely on DW-NOMINATE scores (Poole and Rosenthal,
2007) to demonstrate the existence of polarization because of their widely accepted
use within the congressional voting literature. Over the past several decades, scholars
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demonstrated both the reliability and validity of these measures. However, there are
alternatives to these measures. I briey survey these alternatives, and I demonstrate
that these dierent measurement strategies make little dierence because they are all
based on similar theory, and they produce nearly identical results.
As evidence of polarization in the state legislatures, I rely on NPAT scores (Shor
and McCarty, 2011). These scores have also been show to be valid measure of ideology
and polarization at the state-level. A variety of scaling techniques have been used to
explain the roll-call voting patterns of state legislators, but these analyses are often
conducted for a limited number of years and a limited number of states. Shor and
McCarty's work solves this problem. Their ideology measures allow comparison of
each legislative chamber within each state, comparisons between states, comparisons
over time, and comparisons between Congress.
3.1 Polarization in the American Electorate
As mentioned in the previous chapter, political scientists tend to disagree over
whether the American electorate is polarized. The evidence of polarization I present
in this section is mixed. In term of partisan and ideological identication, the ANES
data show relatively similar distributions over the duration of the survey. However, the
ANES data also show some interesting trends as well. First, by estimating a spatial
model on the issue preference scales presented in the ANES, the data show that the
American electorate is sorting into like-minded groups; although, there is still a good
deal of ideological overlap pertaining to the partisan cleavages. Second, two questions
ask ANES respondents to place the parties on an ideological scale. These two questions
demonstrate that the American electorate very much sees the parties as polarized.
The two party placement variables are a much better test of how polarization aects
individual-level voting behavior because they directly measure how individuals receive
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and evaluate information from political elites. Finally, thermometer rating provide an
opportunity to assess the aective evaluations of the party system and of American
political ideologies.
3.1.1 Partisan and Ideological Identication as a Measures of Polarization
Over the past several decades, political scientists stressed the importance of par-
tisanship for the American electorate. One way to think about polarization is to
consider whether the strength of identication is increasing over time. The ANES has
consistently asked Americans about their strength of party identication during each
election since 1952. Party identication is measured on a 7 point scale that ranges
from Strong Democrat to Strong Republican. Figure 3.1 depicts unweighted estimates
of partisan identication in the American electorate for the 1952, 1972, 1992, and 2012
elections.1
This gures demonstrates that partisan identication is relatively similar during
each of these four elections. The 1952 cross-section suggests a good deal of polar-
ization between each end of the partisan identication scale. Partisans and strong
partisans comprise more of the sample than do independents and independents who
lean towards one of the parties. However, each of the other cross-sections contained
in this gure convey a dierent pattern. They suggest that independents and leaning
independents make up a good deal of the sample of voters in each of their respective
years. If the partisan identication variable was a good indicator of polarization, then
the 1972, 1992, and 2012 distributions would look more like 1952.
The ANES began asking respondents to evaluate their ideological positions during
the 1972 survey. The ideological identication variable is measured on a similar scale
1These estimates are unweighted because no probability weights were constructed
for the 1952 and 1972 cross-sections of the ANES.
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Figure 3.1: Partisan Identication in the American Electorate
to the 7 point party identication scale, ranging from very liberal to very conserva-
tive. Figure 3.2 conveys the unweighted estimates for voter ideological identication
of American voters during 1972, 1992, and 2012 elections. As with the partisan iden-
tication variable, most of the sample respondents are located near the center of the
scale. In each of these samples, more voters seem to identify as conservatives rather
than as liberals. However, the distribution of voters along the ideological identica-
tion scale looks very similar in all three cross-sections, so it is dicult to say whether
ideological self-identication has changed much over time.
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Figure 3.2: Ideological Identication in the American Electorate
3.1.2 Ideological Placement of the Parties as a Measure of Polarization
Beginning in 1972, the ANES asked survey respondents to place each of the parties
on the same ideological scale that was used for ideological self-identication. These
two survey questions provide an excellent opportunity to form a measure of polar-
ization because each of these questions reect how voters view each of the parties
ideologically. These two questions are a good test of elite discourse theory because
this measurement directly reects how voters receive ideological content from political
elites. I dene polarization as the absolute dierence between a survey respondent's
ideological evaluation of the Democratic and Republican parties.
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Figure 3.3 presents the unweighted estimates of polarization based on the ideolog-
ical party placement variables from 1972 through 2012.2 There are a couple of inter-
esting patterns to take from this measure. First, polarization is on the rise through
out the time series. 1974 represents the low point for polarization with an absolute
mean dierence of 2.03 between the two parties. The 2012 election constitutes the
high point in the series with an absolute mean dierence of 3.38 between Democrats
and Republicans. This means that the level of polarization in 2012 is approximately
1.35 points greater on the polarization scale than in 1974.
Second, the beginning of the time series show peaks followed by a precipitous
decline for the next election. This pattern suggests that voters see greater ideological
dierences between the parties during presidential election years than they do during
midterm elections. This is an understandable feature of American politics because
presidential elections tend to receive more attention from the media, and the get-out-
the-vote eorts of each of the two parties tends to be greater in presidential election
years. The end of the series shows much less change following presidential elections.
This is due to the limitations of the data. The ANES did not ask this question in
2002, and there were no surveys in 2006 or 2010.
2There are no estimates for 2002, 2006, or 2010 because no surveys were conducted
in 2006 or 2010, and the question was not asked in 2002.
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Figure 3.3: Polarization Based on Ideological Placement of the Parties, 1972-2012
3.1.3 Issue Scales as a Measure of Polarization
Since the mid-1960s, political scientists have debated the utility of the ideological
self-placement variables. Many argue that self-placements are a poor measure of ide-
ology. Beginning in 1972, the ANES began asking respondents about their preferences
to a variety of issues. These questions asked respondents to locate their preferences on
a 7 point scale. For example, respondents were asked whether the government should
guarantee individuals jobs. A response of 1 would suggest that an individual supports
the government guaranteeing jobs, and a response of 7 indicates that the individual
supports letting the free market determine employment status.
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These types of questions are very useful because they may be thought of as indica-
tors for ideological preferences. In other words, these questions may be used to extract
ideological preferences with a spatial model, and these estimates may be compared
over time. I utilize Basic Space scaling (Poole, 1998) to recover the ideological prefer-
ences of American voters. The Basic Space method is notable for two primary reasons.
First, the method can handle missing data, which allows for comparison across time or
across geographic units, and second, many issues scales can be analyzed in one spatial
model. Basic Space is a similar method to factor analysis, but instead of modeling the
correlations or the covariances of the indicator variables, Poole's method models the
data directly (Armstrong et al., 2014). This is a desirable quality because Jackman
(2001) demonstrates that correlation/covariance methods like factor analysis discard
the means and variances of the input variables. In other words, no data is lost with
the Basic Space scaling method.
The ANES CDF publishes a variety of issues scales over time. However, many
of the questions are only asked for very short time intervals, which makes utilizing
the same indicators of ideology dicult on a year to year basis. Instead of using
the ANES CDF, I make use of the 1972 and 2012 cross-sections of the ANES. For
the 1972 cross-section, I included the following issues scales as indicator variables
for the spatial model: the respondent's position on government guarantee of jobs,
increasing the tax rate, withdraw from Vietnam, government action on ination,
marijuana decriminalization, busing to achieve integration, government healthcare,
women's role is in the workplace, and whether a women should have the right to
terminate her pregnancy.
Figure 3.4 demonstrates that there was not a great deal of ideological divisions
among the American electorate during 1972. Some Democrats are farther to left on
the liberal-conservative dimension, for the most part, Democrats, Independents,
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Figure 3.4: Basic Space Scaling of ANES Issue Scales, 1972
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and Republicans are all stacked on top of one another. These results suggest that
the liberals, moderates, and conservatives are evenly spread across all three types of
partisans.
For the 2012 cross-section of the ANES, I included the following issue scales as indi-
cator variables for the spatial model: the respondent's position on domestic spending,
defense spending, government health care, gun control, the government guaranteeing
jobs, immigration, providing aid to African-Americans, environmental regulations, af-
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Figure 3.5: Basic Space Scaling of ANES Issue Scales, 2012
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rmative action, social security privatization, school spending, welfare spending, gay
marriage, abortion, and the death penalty.
Figure 3.5 suggests that a great deal of ideological sorting has occurred for the
American electorate in 2012. Democrats are primarily clustered to the left of the
spatial model, and Republicans are primarily clustered to the right of the model.
Independents are located in the middle of the spatial map, and they have a great
deal of overlap with both parties. While the relationship is far from perfect, the
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ideological divisions between Democrats, Independents, and Republicans is are much
more noticeable in 2012 than they were in 1972.
3.1.4 Feeling Thermometers as Aective Evaluations
As with the various issue scales, the ANES made use of feeling thermometers for
a variety of political groups. For instance, the ANES asked respondents to report
their assessment of the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, liberals, and conser-
vatives on a scale of 0 to 100. These questions are very dierent than the previous
ANES questions that ask specically about ideology, issue preferences, or partisan-
ship. These feeling thermometers are about aective evaluations of particular groups.
While examining each of these feeling thermometers in isolation of one another can
inform researchers about a particular group, for the purposes of this project, it is
more appropriate to analyze these scales in terms of the party system or in terms of
political ideologies. As result, I take the average of the two party thermometers, and
then, I take the average of the two ideology thermometers in order to form alternative
specications of partisanship and ideology. In contrast to the party placement vari-
ables or the Basic Space Scaling estimates, lower averages of the thermometer scales
should reect a lower aective evaluation of the party system or political ideologies,
which should result due to a polarized electorate.
Figure 3.6 presents the average party thermometer rating means by year from
1978 through 2012.3 At earlier time points in the series, ANES respondents had much
higher aective evaluations of the two parties. This likely reects the lower amount
of polarization perceived by voter during the 1970s and 1980s. During the 1990s, the
mean evaluations of the two parties begins to drop precipitously. This likely reects
3There is no estimate for 2002 because the two party thermometer questions were
not asked in this year.
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Figure 3.6: Average Party Thermometer Ratings, 1978-2012
voters' dissatisfaction with the partisan imbroglios between President Clinton and
Congressional Republicans. The downward trend continues during the Bush presi-
dency, and it explodes during Obama's tenure in oce.
Figure 3.7 reports the average ideological thermometer rating means by year from
1964 through 2012.4 Unlike the average party thermometer rating, the trend is much
less noticeable for the average ideological thermometer rating. The 1970, 1982, and
2012 elections are noticeable low points for aective evaluations of ideology, but for
other elections in the series, the mean evaluation uctuates around the center of the
scale.
4There are no estimates for 1978 because the question was not asked in that year.
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Figure 3.7: Average Ideological Thermometer Ratings, 1964-2012
3.2 Polarization in Congress
An impressive amount of research demonstrates the existence of polarization in
Congress (Fiorina et al., 2006; Lowry and Shipan, 2002; McCarty et al., 2006; Poole
and Daniels, 1985; Poole and Rosenthal, 1984, 1991, 2001, 2007; Fleisher and Bond,
2004; Rohde, 1991). Scholars use a variety of techniques to identify a polarized party
system. Of these, three of the most common methods to quantify partisanship in
Congress are the percentage of party unity votes, the percentage of moderate leg-
islators, and producing measures of ideology from roll-call analysis. A party unity
vote occurs when a majority of one party votes against a majority of the other party.
Figure 3.8 presents the percentage of party unity votes in Congress from 1956-2012.
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Generally, a noticeable pattern of party unity voting emerges from the 1950s onward.
During the 1970s, party unity voting declined in both chambers, and then the level
of partisan voting rebounds, which is noticeable by the steadily increasing trend de-
picted in the gure. In 1970, the House cast 27.1% of party unity votes, which was
the lowest percentage in the post-World War II era. In 1955, the Senate voted 29.9%
of the time along party lines, which was its lowest instance of party unity votes.
The highest frequency of party unity votes occurred rather recently. In 2011, the
House voted along party lines 75.8% of the time. This incredibly high percentage of
party unity votes is undoubtedly a reection of the sharp divisions in the chamber, and
the presence of divided government. In 2010, the Senate reached its highest instance
of party unity votes where they voted along party lines 78.6% of the time.
Several factors explain the increased number of party unity votes. First, both the
ideological divide between the two parties and the ideological homogeneity within each
party increased considerably since the 1950s (Poole and Rosenthal, 2007; McCarty
et al., 2006; Abramowitz and Saunders, 1998). Second, the number of ideologically
moderate members and cross-pressured partisans are declining rapidly (Fleisher and
Bond, 2004). Moderates are less ideological than their fellow partisans, but they still
have more in common with their own party than they do with the other party. Cross-
pressured members are more ideologically similar to the opposition party than they
are to their own party. When Congress possesses a high percentage of cross-pressured
members, the two parties display overlapping ideologies and policy cleavages. How-
ever, when the number of moderate and cross-pressured members declines, this indi-
cates a sharp division between the parties; one that makes compromise unlikely if not
impossible.
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Figure 3.8: Party Unity Votes in the U.S. Congress, 1956-2012
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During the 1950s, the atmosphere in Congress was much more collegial than it
is today. Members of Congress frequently crossed the aisle to work with members of
the other party. Strict party line votes were much less common, and the two par-
ties displayed a signicant number of over-lapping public policy cleavages. In other
words, both the Republican and Democratic parties possessed a majority of members
considered to be ideological moderates. That is not to say that no partisan squab-
bles existed within the legislature. They did exist but not to the extent that we see
them today. Compromise was possible, and we thought of our representatives more
like statespersons rather than self-serving partisans. In many ways, this period nearly
achieved the normative requirements of Madisonian democracy.5
5The term Madisonian democracy means very dierent things to dierent scholars,
especially in the political theory literature. I do not intended to enter this debate here.
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Figure 3.9 illustrates how the number of moderates in Congress changed over
time.6 At the end of the 19th century, the number of moderates in Congress was
relatively low, but this trend began to change during the World War II era where each
chamber displayed a record number of moderates. Recently, the number of moderates
in each chamber resembles the pattern at the beginning of the time series. Generally,
the House of Representatives has a smaller percentage of members who are moderates
than does the Senate. However, in the post-Civil Rights era, the dierence between
the two chambers is negligible, and the percentage of moderates in each chamber is
on a steady decline.
Scholars typically assess levels of polarization by quantifying ideology or partisan-
ship through roll-call votes, but no consensus exists as to which conception produces
greater inuence on the behavior of legislators. A wealth of research (Krehbiel, 1998;
Levitt, 1996; Lucas and Deutchman, 2007; Poole and Daniels, 1985; Poole and Rosen-
thal, 1991, 2001, 2007; Cox and Poole, 2002; McCarty et al., 2001, 2006) stresses that
individual preferences and, more specically, ideology guide legislator voting deci-
sions and that these preferences are stable over time. Others (Garand and Clayton,
1986; Lee, 2009; Sinclair, 1981, 2006; Smith, 2007; Snyder and Groseclose, 2000, 2001;
Wright and Schaner, 2002) argue that partisanship guides voting decisions for mem-
bers of Congress. This is an important debate within the congressional voting liter-
Rather, I am simply referring to the notion that compromise between the majority
and the minority is typically seen as ideal. For more on this discussion, see Dahl
(1956).
6Members of Congress are considered moderates if their DW-NOMINATE score
falls between -.25 and .25 (Fleisher and Bond, 2004).
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Figure 3.9: Percentage of Moderates in the U.S. Congress, 1879-2012
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ature because each perspective implies dierent things for members of Congress. If
legislators use their personal preferences to vote a certain way, then they are relatively
free to support any proposal of their choice. However, if party is more important than
personal preferences, then the party apparatus considerably constrains their choices.
Figure 3.10 illustrates how the nature of polarization waxed and waned in Congress
since the end of the 19th century. This gure presents the mean dierence between
Republicans and Democrats based on the rst dimension of DW-NOMINATE scores.7
7The DW-NOMINATE scores were compiled primarily by Keith Poole and Howard
Rosenthal. The data are made available on their website, which may be found at
the following address: http://pooleandrosenthal.com/political_polarization.
asp. I provide a full discussion of the DW-NOMINATE procedure in the Data and
Measurement section.
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Figure 3.10: Ideological Polarization in the U.S. Congress, 1879-2012
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These measures of ideology reect a member's voting record, and Poole and Rosenthal
(2007) argue that they are direct measures of ideology. The beginning of the time
series indicates a remarkable amount of polarization in both chambers of Congress.
Polarization in both chambers of Congress reached an all-time low during the World
War II years, but it rebounded during the 1960s. The current level of polarization
constitutes an all-time high in the House of Representatives, and the current level of
partisanship in the Senate matched its peak-level during the end of the 19th century.
During the 1950s, a segment of the political science community (American Political
Science Association 1950; Ranney 1951, 1954) felt ideologically distinct parties were a
good thing, and they argued that Congress should pursue reforms to make Congress
function more like party-based European parliaments. According to this so-called
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responsible or conditional party government theory, each party should oer strikingly
dierent visions for the country, and the majority party should be able to implement
its policy platform. However, the minority party must behave in a responsible manner
by presenting a contrasting vision for society that they may implement upon their
return to power. Conditional party government scholars consider the dialogue between
the parties as the essence of rational debate, and rational debate is a sign of a healthy
democracy.
A number of scholars (Rohde, 1991; Aldrich and Rohde, 2001) argue that the
American Congress nearly meets the requirements for conditional party government.
However, not everyone agrees that an ideologically charged party system is good
for democracy because polarization manifests itself in the procedural mechanisms of
Congress. Sinclair (2006) laments this arrangement and says that polarization di-
rectly relates to the decline of sanguine discourse. In other work (Sinclair, 2007),
she demonstrates that unfettered partisan control of Congress leads to unorthodox
parliamentary tactics that assures the majority procedural advantage over the mi-
nority party. This is especially true in the House of Representatives where tactics to
maintain dominance include but are not limited to suspension of the rules of debate,
ignoring minority amendments, multiple committee referrals to kill minority spon-
sored legislation, and combining partisan legislation with omnibus bills so that it is
not politically expedient for the minority party to vote against the bill. An example
of using an omnibus bill for partisan means is when leaders combine divisive issues
with the budget to promote legislative success. Under this type of atmosphere, the
minority's only weapon is unity. They must remain steadfast and prevent any of their
members from defecting to the winning coalition.
The structural arrangement of the Senate produces natural protections for the
minority party because parliamentary procedure is very dierent in this chamber.
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Mainly due to unanimous consent agreements, the minority possesses considerably
more power in the Senate than they do in the House of Representatives. Here, the
minority's chief weapon is obstruction, and the libuster, more often than not, brings
the Senate to its knees. Gridlock characterizes the institution because of the super-
majoritarian requirement to overcome the libuster. This institutional arrangement
of the Senate paralyzes the entire legislative branch. As a result, Congress, frequently,
cannot address the issues of the day.
3.3 Polarization in the State Legislatures
Roll-call analyses can also be useful techniques to quantify polarization in the state
Legislatures. The theories that are used to explain polarization at the national-level
can also be applied in state legislative branches of government. A few scholars (Aldrich
and Battista, 2002; Wright and Clark, 2005; McCarty et al., 2006) have estimated
spatial models to quantify the role of ideology in state legislative chambers. However,
the availability of roll-call records at the state-level is much less than it is for Congress
which typically means that state-by-state comparisons and year-to-year comparisons
are dicult.
At least, this was the case until Shor and McCarty (2011) collected enough roll-call
data at the state level and created a measure that placed the state legislative chambers
on the same ideological scale. These measures are known as NPAT scores. A fuller
description of these measures will be addressed in Chapter 5. For now, it is enough to
say that these NPAT scores are very similar to NOMINATE scores. A single dimension
explains the lion's share of variance in roll-call behavior found in state legislatures.
NPAT scores are comparable over-time, between legislative chambers, and between
each state. Additionally, these measure of ideology (and polarization) are comparable
to polarization scores in Congress.
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Figure 3.11 shows the yearly mean polarization scores across state Senates and
State Houses. Both of the overall polarization trends are remarkably similar. The
level of mean polarization in state Senates is roughly the same as the level of mean
polarization in state Houses. The low point in each of the series was 1996, and 2014
represents the high point of polarization in the time series. This suggests that polar-
ization is not only a phenomenon found in Congress. It extends to the legislatures as
well.
Figure 3.12 breaks down some of the yearly averages by party and by chamber.
In other words, this gure shows the party ideological means by state legislative
chamber. The two panels on the left side of the gure show the average ideological
estimates for state Republicans, and the two panels on the right side of the gure
show the average ideological estimates for state Democrats.
The the average ideology scores for House Republicans reached an all time high
in 1994, and then, it took a drastic dive to its low point in 1996. Since then, the
average ideological score for House Republicans has been steadily increasing, but it is
still not as high as the 1994 average. Senate Republicans have a somewhat dierent
story than their House counterparts. For example, 1996 was also the low point for
their ideological means, but their highest ideological mean score occurred in 2014.
This means that state Senate Republicans are the most ideological that they have
ever been.
The overall trends for state Democrats are remarkably similar to their Republican
counterparts. The two decreasing trend lines show that they are also becoming much
more liberal than they have been in the past. The overall average scores for House
Democrats were at the most moderate point in 1994, and they have been steadily
increasing since 1994. House Democrats in the state legislatures are currently at their
all-time high in terms of average ideological scores. The trends for Senate Democrats
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Figure 3.11: Polarization in the State Legislatures, 1993-2014
are largely the same as their House counterparts. They were the most moderate that
they have ever been in 1994, and they are now the most liberal they have ever been.
The two previous gures showed how state legislature polarization has changed on
a year to year basis, and these gures have shown how the two parties have changed
in terms of ideology in their respective chamber. However, these two gures do not
account for dierent levels of polarization among the states. The next two gures
demonstrate how states with low, medium, and high polarization have changed from
1996 until 2014. The two polarization variables were binned into roughly equal thirds
based on a percentile raking of their polarization scores. I decided to use 1996 as the
starting point of this comparison because the 1994 and 1995 years have a lot of cases
missing from the data.
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Figure 3.12: Ideology in the State Legislatures by Party and Chamber, 1993-2014
In order to accomplish this comparison, I had to rescale the polarization variables
so each state would have the same starting point. To do this, I divided each legislative
chambers polarization measure by their 1996 value and multiplied it by 100. This
measure of polarization places each state on a par with one another, and it shows
how much a state has changed on a year-to-year basis. A score of 100 represents the
base line score in 1996, so a score of 110 in 1997 would show an increase of 10%
increase in polarization compared to the state's 1996 value. A score of 140 in 2016
would be a 40% increase in polarization since 1996. A score of 90 in 1997 would
represent a 10% decrease in polarization compared to the state's value in 1996, and
a score of 70 in 2016 represents a 30% decrease since 1996.
Figure 3.13 shows how polarization has changed in state Senates from 1996-2014.
A few interesting things are immediately noticeable from this gure. First, regardless
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Figure 3.13: Change in State Senate Polarization, 1996-2014
of whether states exhibit high, medium, or low polarization, all states have shown
an increase in state Senate chambers since 1996. Second, states with low or medium
polarization display the most change in their Senates since 1996. In fact, the gure
shows that these two groupings have essentially the same rate of change. States with
low or medium polarization have seen nearly a 50% rise in polarization since 1996.
Third, even though states that were classied as highly polarized states in 1996 have
still increased in their polarization levels by 10%.
Figure 3.14 shows how polarization has changed in state Houses from 1996 - 2014.
The rate of change is very dierent for state Houses than it is for state Senates. The
rst striking dierence is that states that displayed a low amount of polarization in
1996 actually saw a decrease in polarization compared to to the state Senates. For
example, state with a low amount of polarization in their state houses have seen a
decrease in polarization by a little more than 20%. Second, states who had a medium
amount of polarization in 1996 have seen their House chamber polarization level in-
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Figure 3.14: Change in State House Polarization, 1996-2014
crease by about 25%, and states with high levels of polarization in 1996 have seen a
20% increase compared to their 1996 levels.
3.4 Summary
The analyses in this chapter have shown a lot of interesting things about polariza-
tion in the electorate and polarization in our legislative branches. First, polarization
in the electorate does not seem to be on the same scale as it does in Congress or in
our state legislatures. The analyses pertaining to partisan identication, ideological
identication, and multi-dimensional scaling of issue scales shows the the American
electorate gravitates toward the political center. However, that does not mean that the
electorate has not changed over the past few decades. A remarkable amount of sorting
has undertaken in the American electorate. Voters who identify as Republicans and
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Democrats are more like their co-partisans than they have ever been. The basicspace
scaling analysis showed clear clustering of partisans on their respective sides of the
ideological scale. Despite this clustering, Democratic and Republican voters are still
relatively close to the center.
The DW-NOMINATE scores show that members of Congress are very polarized.
This trend has been on the rise since the 1950s, and it is continuing until today. Parties
in Congress are more cohesive than they have ever been. The number of moderates is
on the decline, and party unity voting is at an all time high. However, polarization is
not a phenomenon conned to Congress. NPAT scores indicates that state legislatures
have polarized as well, and they also indicate the polarization is on the rise in state
legislatures as well.
Even though voters tend to be more moderate than legislators. Voters still see
the party system as very polarized. The analyses of party placement show that this
is surely the case. The fact that voters see the party system as very polarized, and
that they have sorted into like-minded groups suggests that voters are responding to
polarized elite discourse. This means that the polarization measure based on party
placement will be incredibly important in the coming analyses of voter turnout. How
voters see the party system should have an inuence on whether an individual decides
to vote.
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Chapter 4
MICRO-LEVEL POLARIZATION AND U.S. ELECTIONS
In this chapter, I demonstrate that partisan polarization signicantly impacts several
aspects of individual-level voting behavior in congressional elections. Using data from
the American National Election Survey (ANES) cumulative data le (CDF), I suggest
that polarization is a signicant variable that aects how voters evaluate both of the
parties in terms of salience and aect. I also indicate that partisan polarization has
a positive impact on micro-level turnout, meaning that it increases the probability of
voting for all types of partisans. Finally, I denote that partisan polarization increases
the likelihood that voters who identify as Independents will vote for Democratic
Senate candidates during the 2012 election, but I also nd that polarization increases
the likelihood that Independents will vote for Republican Senate candidates in the
1992 election. Polarization seems to only be related to vote choice in the House of
Representatives during the 2012 election. The results I present in this chapter suggest
that the importance of polarization is one the rise, and that it has a signicant impact
on the political behavior of American voters.
4.1 Aective Evaluations of Parties
Starting in the 1950s, the ANES asked respondents to list the number of things
they like and the number of things they dislike about each of the parties in two
separate questions. The responses for each of these questions were coded on a scale
from 0 likes (or dislikes) to 5 likes (or dislikes). These two questions were used to form
aect variables for both Democrats and Republicans respectively by subtracting the
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total number of dislikes from the total number of likes. The aect scales for both
Republicans and Democrats range from -5 to 5.
Although the ANES began asking these types of questions in the 1950s, they
discontinued this line of questioning with the 2004 survey. Additionally, the ANES
did not ask survey respondents to place each of the parties on a seven-point ideological
scale until 1972, which means that construction of the party polarization variable is
not possible until the 1972 election. Considering the limitation of the data, I use
the 1972, 1992, and 2004 subsets of the ANES CDF to evaluate how polarization is
related to party aect.
Table 4.1 presents the linear model results for aective evaluations of the Republi-
can Party. The models contain three primary terms of interest { party identication,
polarization, and an interaction between party identication and polarization { as
well as a list of statistical controls that are common in the political behavior liter-
ature. The estimates are adjusted with the probability weights furnished within the
ANES CDF, and the standard error of the estimates are adjusted via Taylor Series
approximation.1
For the 2004 election, the party identication and polarization variables are sta-
tistically signicant, and the eect of these variables is in the expected direction.
A one-unit increase in the party identication variable produces a .36 more positive
evaluation of the Republican Party while holding other relevant variables constant.
1These models were estimated with the Zelig 4.2 package in R (Carnes, 2015). The
Zelig package works by calling to the Survey package (Lumley, 2015) in R, which
adjusts the estimates according to their probability weights. The Zelig package is a
useful tool for inference because it is able to simulate predictions for complicated
models. For more on how the probability weights are constructed please see DeBell
and Krosnick (2009) and the American National Election Survey codebook. For more
on the details behind Taylor Series Approximation please see the above citations for
the Zelig and Survey Packages.
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Table 4.1: Linear Models of Republican Party Aect
2004 1992 1972 1972
Intercept  1:05  1:03  2:08  2:44
(0:39) (0:25) (0:37) (0:33)
Party ID 0:36 0:26 0:33 0:42
(0:05) (0:03) (0:06) (0:03)
Polarization  0:17  0:24  0:11 0:04
(0:07) (0:04) (0:08) (0:04)
Interest (Medium) 0:07  0:03 0:11 0:11
(0:12) (0:09) (0:15) (0:15)
Interest (High)  0:16  0:12 0:03 0:04
(0:13) (0:10) (0:17) (0:17)
Age  0:00  0:00 0:00 0:00
(0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
Male 0:02  0:04 0:03 0:02
(0:10) (0:07) (0:11) (0:12)
White  0:39  0:17 0:47 0:50
(0:11) (0:09) (0:19) (0:19)
South 0:11 0:19 0:31 0:31
(0:11) (0:07) (0:14) (0:14)
Education (No Diploma)  0:34  0:13 0:12 0:11
(0:29) (0:18) (0:19) (0:19)
Education (High School)  0:32  0:17  0:06  0:09
(0:25) (0:16) (0:17) (0:17)
Education (Some College)  0:39  0:31  0:15  0:18
(0:26) (0:17) (0:21) (0:21)
Education (Bachelors)  0:62  0:39  0:16  0:20
(0:29) (0:18) (0:21) (0:21)
Education (Grad Degree)  0:65  0:54  0:30  0:33
(0:31) (0:19) (0:37) (0:37)
Income (33rd Percentile) 0:20 0:20 0:25 0:27
(0:14) (0:12) (0:23) (0:24)
Income (67th Percentile) 0:12 0:25 0:05 0:07
(0:15) (0:12) (0:18) (0:18)
Income (95th Percentile) 0:16 0:16  0:06  0:04
(0:16) (0:12) (0:20) (0:20)
Income (100th Percentile) 0:31  0:02 0:32 0:34
(0:21) (0:19) (0:31) (0:32)
Party ID * Polarization 0:05 0:06 0:04
(0:02) (0:01) (0:02)
N 949 1807 679 679
AIC 3488:22 6383:10 2420:87 2422:70
BIC 3857:23 6801:06 2764:44 2748:19
logL  1668:11  3115:55  1134:44  1139:35
Standard errors in parentheses
 indicates signicance at p < 0:05
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This is understandable considering that higher values of the party identication vari-
able represents strong Republican voters. By contrast, a one-unit increase in the
polarization variable produces a .17 decrease in aective evaluations of the Republi-
can Party, all else equal. Thus, the model suggests that higher levels of polarization
produce a greater likelihood that a voter will negatively evaluate the Republican
Party. However, the relationship between polarization and Republican Party aect
may change according to strength of party identication. The signicant interaction
term between party identication and polarization for the 2004 model suggests that
this is the case. In other words, polarization aects strong partisans dierently than
it does voters who identify as Independent partisans.
For example, the model suggests that among voters who perceive maximum levels
of polarization a strong Republican will have 3.78 more positive evaluations of the
Republican Party than will a strong Democrat, all else equal.2 The model also suggests
that among voters who perceive no polarization a strong Republican will have 2.13
more positive evaluations of the Republican Party than will a strong Democrat, ceteris
paribus. Considering other relevant factors, strong Republicans who see a high-level
of polarization between the parties will have .95 higher aective evaluations of the
Republican Party than will strong Republicans who see no polarization between the
parties, and strong Democrats who see a high level of polarization between the parties
will have .71 lower evaluations of the Republican Party than will strong Democrats
who see no polarization between the parties.
Figure 4.1 contains the conditional predictions based on the linear model for Re-
publican Aect during the 2004 election.3 The mean predictions and their correspond-
2These model predictions were estimated with the simulation function in the Zelig
package.
3These model predictions were created using the base \predict" command in the
R Statistical Computing Environment.
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ing 95% condence intervals were estimated for a 40 year old, white, non-southern,
male with a bachelor's degree and high interest in the campaign. Values of parti-
sanship were held at strong Republican, pure Independent, and strong Democrat.
The gure shows that by moving from no polarization to high levels of polarization
a strong Republican is much more likely to report more positive evaluations of the
Republican Party. By contrast, a strong Democrat is much more likely to report more
negative evaluations of the Republican Party as polarization moves from its minimum
to maximum value. Moreover, pure Independents are equally likely to report the same
number of aective evaluations of the Republican Party regardless of whether they
view the party system as polarized during the 2004 election.
For the 1992 election, a similar relationship exists between polarization and the
aective evaluations of the Republican Party; although, the relationship between
these variables is slightly less pronounced than it was in the 2004 election. The party
identication and polarization variables are both signicant in the 1992 model. Both
of the variables' eects for the 1992 model are in the same direction as the 2004
model. A one-unit increase in the party identication variable produces a .26 greater
positive evaluation of the Republican Party, and a one-unit increase in the polarization
variable produces a .24 decrease in positive evaluations of the Republican Party. The
interaction term between party identication and polarization is also signicant for
the 1992 election, which, again, suggests that the relationship between polarization
and partisan identication is dierent depending on whether a voter identies as a
strong partisan or a political independent.
For instance, this model suggests that among voters who perceive maximum lev-
els of polarization a strong Republican will have 3.71 more positive evaluations of
the Republican Party than will a strong Democrat after considering other relevant
predictors. However, among voters who see no polarization between the two parties,
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Figure 4.1: Predicted Republican Party Aect by Partisanship, 2004
a strong Republican will have on average 1.56 more positive evaluations of the Repub-
lican Party than will strong Democrats, all else equal. By holding relevant predictors
at their mean values, a strong Republican who sees a high level of polarization will
have 1.08 greater evaluations of the Republican Party than will a strong Republican
who sees no polarization between the parties. Similarly, a strong Democrat who sees a
high level of polarization will have 1.06 lower aective evaluations of the Republican
Party than will a strong Democrat who sees no polarization between the parties, all
else equal.
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Figure 4.2 reports the conditional predictions based on the linear model for Repub-
lican Aect during the 1992 election. As with the 2004 model, the mean predictions
and their corresponding 95% condence intervals were estimated for a 40 year old,
white, non-southern, male with a bachelor's degree and high interest in the campaign.
Values of partisanship were held at strong Republican, pure Independent, and strong
Democrat. The relationship between party identication, polarization, and Repub-
lican aect is largely the same as it was for the 2004 election. Both sets of strong
partisans have the same respective trend { strong Republicans are more likely to
provide more positive evaluations of the Republican Party, but strong Democrats are
much more likely to report negative assessments of the party. Independents are virtu-
ally unaected by polarization when it comes to their evaluations of the Republican
Party during the 1992 election. The primary dierence between the predictions for the
1992 model compared to the predictions for the 2004 model is that there is slightly
less uncertainly in the predictions for 1992, which is evidenced by the closer t of
the condence intervals to the prediction line. However, the dierence in estimate
uncertainty between the two models is likely due to the larger sample size in the 1992
cross-section of the ANES.
For the 1972 election, the relationship between polarization and aective evalu-
ations of the Republican Party is much less pronounced than in 2004 or 1992. For
this model, the party identication variable is statistically signicant, and its eect
is in the expected direction. A one-unit increase in the party identication variable
produces a .33 more positive evaluation of the Republican Party. However, the po-
larization term is not statistically signicant. The interaction term between party
identication and polarization is signicant in the 1972 model. However, when one of
the main terms of the interaction is not statistically signicant, then the convention
in political science is to remove the interaction from the model. I re-estimated the
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Figure 4.2: Predicted Republican Party Aect by Partisanship, 1992
model without the interaction, but the polarization term is still not signicant. The
results of this model are located in the fourth column of Table 4.1. Because the
polarization term is not signicant, I refrain from interpreting this model further.
Table 4.2 outlines the linear model results for aective evaluations of the Demo-
cratic Party during the 2004, 1992, and 1972 elections. As with the models for the
aective evaluations of the Republican Party, the estimates are adjusted according
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Table 4.2: Linear Models of Democratic Party Aect
2004 1992 1972 1972
Intercept 1:39 1:52 2:22 2:50
(0:45) (0:25) (0:38) (0:33)
Party ID  0:17  0:23  0:25  0:33
(0:06) (0:03) (0:05) (0:03)
Polarization 0:35 0:27 0:14 0:03
(0:08) (0:04) (0:08) (0:04)
Interest (Medium) 0:13 0:32 0:29 0:29
(0:17) (0:09) (0:14) (0:14)
Interest (High) 0:13 0:24 0:14 0:13
(0:19) (0:10) (0:16) (0:16)
Age  0:00  0:00  0:01  0:01
(0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
Male  0:12  0:24  0:04  0:03
(0:11) (0:07) (0:11) (0:11)
White  0:15  0:14  0:85  0:87
(0:13) (0:08) (0:19) (0:19)
South  0:04  0:18  0:22  0:22
(0:12) (0:07) (0:13) (0:13)
Education (No Diploma) 0:18  0:02  0:44  0:43
(0:34) (0:17) (0:22) (0:22)
Education (High School)  0:16  0:13  0:40  0:38
(0:32) (0:14) (0:19) (0:19)
Education (Some College)  0:11  0:23  0:65  0:62
(0:33) (0:15) (0:21) (0:21)
Education (Bachelors)  0:23  0:13  0:55  0:52
(0:35) (0:17) (0:22) (0:22)
Education (Grad Degree) 0:11  0:03  0:23  0:21
(0:36) (0:19) (0:30) (0:30)
Income (33rd Percentile)  0:15 0:03  0:09  0:10
(0:17) (0:11) (0:23) (0:23)
Income (67th Percentile) 0:02  0:15 0:15 0:13
(0:18) (0:11) (0:17) (0:17)
Income (95th Percentile)  0:13  0:08 0:16 0:15
(0:19) (0:12) (0:18) (0:18)
Income (100th Percentile)  0:22  0:06  0:22  0:23
(0:24) (0:21) (0:25) (0:25)
Party ID * Polarization  0:10  0:08  0:03
(0:02) (0:01) (0:02)
N 949 1807 679 679
AIC 3628:26 6341:27 2388:12 2388:52
BIC 3997:27 6759:22 2731:68 2714:01
logL  1738:13  3094:63  1118:06  1122:26
Standard errors in parentheses
 indicates signicance at p < 0:05
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to the probability weights furnished within the ANES CDF, and the standard errors
are adjusted by Taylor Series Approximation.4
The model for the 2004 election suggests that both party identication and polar-
ization are important components of aective evaluations for the Democratic Party.
Both variables are statistically signicant in this model. Because higher values of the
party identication variable represent Republicans, the variable's negative eect is
in the hypothesized direction. A one-unit increase in the party identication variable
produces a .17 reduction in positive aective evaluations of the Democratic Party.
The direction of the polarization term may seem surprising at rst. This coecient
suggests that a one-unit increase in the polarization variable produces a .35 greater
evaluation of the Democratic Party. This may seem odd considering that the coe-
cients in the Republican aect models were negatively signed.5 However, this variable
should be interpreted in light of the interaction between party identication and po-
larization because higher order terms { like interactions { take precedent in model
interpretation. In order to help with further interpretations of the model, I turn to
simulated predictions of Democratic aect during the 2004 election.
The 2004 model suggests that among voters who see a maximum level of polariza-
tion a strong Democrat will report 4.47 higher evaluations of the Democratic Party
than will a strong Republican, ceteris paribus. The model also suggests that among
voters who are average on other characteristics and who see no polarization between
the two parties strong Democrats will have 1.03 greater evaluations of the Democratic
Party than will strong Republicans. For strong Republicans who see a maximum level
4Again, these calculations were automatically performed by the Zelig package in R
due to the underlying survey design.
5When a model predicts a coecient opposite its expected direction, this can often
be a sign of multicollinearity. I conducted a variance ination factor test, and the
results are not signicant. Multicollinearity is not a concern for the Democratic aect
model.
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of polarization between the two parties, they will have 1.92 fewer positive evaluations
of the Democratic Party than a strong Republican who sees no polarization between
the two parties, all else equal. Democrats who see a maximum amount of polariza-
tion between the two parties will, on average, have 1.50 greater evaluations of the
Democratic Party than will strong Democrats who see no polarization between the
two parties.
Figure 4.3 contains the conditional predictions based on the linear model for
Democratic Aect during the 2004 election. As with the predictions for Republican
aect, the mean predictions and their corresponding 95% condence intervals were
estimated for a 40 year old, white, non-southern, male with a bachelor's degree and
high interest in the campaign. Values of partisanship were held at strong Republican,
pure Independent, and strong Democrat. The gure suggests that by moving from
no polarization to a maximum level of polarization a strong Democrat is much more
likely to report positive evaluations of the Democratic Party. By contrast, a strong
Republican is much more likely to report more negative evaluations of the Repub-
lican Party as polarization moves from the minimum value to the maximum value.
Independents are largely unaected by polarization when it comes to their aective
evaluations of Democrats.
However, there are two primary dierences between the predictions for this model
and the model predictions for Republican aect during the 2004 election. First, al-
though Independents do not appear to be as aected by polarization as the strong
partisans, they are more likely to report negative evaluations of the Democrats than
they are the Republicans under high levels of polarization. The trend for Independent
aective evaluations of the Republicans was completely at, meaning there was no
change, but the trend for Independent aective evaluations of Democrats is downward
but the change from minimum polarization to maximum polarization is incredibly
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Figure 4.3: Predicted Democratic Party Aect by Partisanship, 2004
small. Second, under no polarization, all three partisan groups have relatively similar
assessments of Democrats. This is noticeable by the overlapping condence intervals
of the predictions in Figure 4.3, which suggests no real dierence for assessments of
Democrats between partisan groups for the 2004 election when voters see no polar-
ization between the parties.
The 1992 model suggests a similar relationship between aective evaluations of
the Democratic Party and polarization as does the 2004 model. Both the party iden-
tication and polarization variables are statistically signicant. A one-unit increase
in the party identication variable produces a .23 decrease in positive evaluations of
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the Democratic Party, and a one unit increase in the polarization variable produces
a .27 greater evaluation of the Democratic Party, all else equal. Additionally, the
interaction between party identication and polarization is statistically signicant,
which suggests that polarization aects dierent types of partisans dierently when
it comes to aective evaluations of the Democratic Party during the 1992 election. As
with the 2004 model, this coecient should be interpreted in light of the predictions
of the model.
For example, the 1992 Democratic Aect model suggests that among voters who
see a maximum level of polarization a strong Democrat will have on average 4.15
greater evaluations of the Democratic Party than will a strong Republican, but among
voters who see no polarization between the two parties a strong Democrat will only
have 1.40 greater evaluations of the Democratic Party than will a strong Republican.
For a strong Republican who sees a maximum level of polarization, they will have
1.59 fewer positive evaluations of the Democratic Party than will a strong Repub-
lican who sees no polarization between the two parties, all else equal. By contrast,
a strong Democrat who sees the maximum level of polarization will have 1.15 more
positive evaluations of the Democratic Party than will a strong Democrat who sees
no polarization between the parties, ceteris paribus.
Figure 4.4 contains the conditional predictions based on the linear model for
Democratic Aect during the 1992 election. As with the previous models of partisan
aective evaluations, the mean predictions and their corresponding 95% condence
intervals were estimated for a 40 year old, white, non-southern, male with a bachelor's
degree and high interest in the campaign. Values of partisanship were held at strong
Republican, pure Independent, and strong Democrat. The relationship between po-
larization, party identication, and Democratic Party aect is nearly identical in 1992
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Figure 4.4: Predicted Democratic Party Aect by Partisanship, 1992
as it was in 2004. As polarization moves from the minimum value to the maximum
value, Democrats are more likely to report greater aective evaluations of the Demo-
cratic Party, but strong Republicans are much less likely to report positive evaluations
of the Democratic as their perception of polarization changes. Independents are largely
unaected by polarization when it comes to their aective evaluations of Democrats,
but there are still slightly less likely to report positive evaluations of the Democratic
Party under high levels of polarization.
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In the 1972 model, neither the polarization variable nor the interaction between
party identication is statistically signicant.6 As result, I re-estimated the model
by removing the interaction term. Excluding the interaction makes no dierence for
model interpretation because the main polarization term is still not statistically sig-
nicant.7 Because the main term of interest is not related to aective evaluations of
the Democratic Party, I refrain from interpreting this model further.
4.2 Evaluations of Party Salience
As with the aective assessment variables, the ANES furnishes party salience
variables based on the number of likes and dislikes that respondents give during their
interviews. However, the calculation used to form these variables is slightly dierent
than the aective evaluation variables in the previous section. The salience variables
are formed by adding the number of likes to the number of dislikes for each of the
parties respectively. Each of the party salience variables range from 0 to 10. Like the
aect variables, the salience variables were made available to researchers beginning
in the 1950s and ending with the 2004 ANES survey. Because the party placement
variables which are necessary to produce the polarization variables were not made
available until 1972 election, I make use of the 1972, 1992, and 2004 subsets of the
ANES CDF to evaluate how polarization is related to party salience.
The party salience variables count the number of times a respondent provides a
statement about each of the parties. Because count distributions violate many of the
precepts of regression analysis derived from the Gauss-Markov assumption, I esti-
6Technically the polarization variable is signicant at the p <.10 level. However,
this threshold is beyond the alpha level that is conventionally accepted in Political
Science. As result, I conclude that the term is not statistically signicant.
7For this model, the polarization term is no longer signicant at any conventional
level of signicance.
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mated a series of zero-inated negative binomial models to account for overdispersion
and the high preponderance of zeros in each of these count variables.8 I estimated each
of these models within the psuedolikelihood framework in order to incorporate the
survey probability weights into the likelihood.9 Additionally, I estimated these models
with robust standard errors because count models always contain heteroskedasticity
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2010; Long, 1997). The ination portion of the model (the
binary component to explain the excess of zeros in the data) was t to the data with
a logit link.
Table 4.3 displays the zero-inated negative binomial model results of party salience
for Republicans and Democrats during the 2004 election. In each of the two models,
the polarization variable is not statistically signicant in the count portion of the
model, meaning that polarization is unrelated to the number of comments a respon-
dent makes about each of the two parties. However, the polarization variable is sta-
tistically signicant in the ination portion of the model, meaning that polarization
reduces the likelihood of a respondent always giving zero comments about Repub-
8I estimated a series of count models on the unweighted survey data to determine
whether the data was overdispersed and whether a zero-inated count was appro-
priate. I used an unweighted model initially because likelihood ratio tests and their
corresponding t statistics are inappropriate for models estimated by psuedolike-
lihood methods to account for the inverse probability weights of the survey data.
The likelihood ratio test between the poisson and the negative binomial models was
statistically signicant (2 = 68:28, p < :001), which indicates that the data are
overdispersed, and the negative binomial is the correct count model. Additionally,
I estimated a Vuong Test for non-nested models to determine whether an ination
model was necessary. The test was statistically signicant (z =  1:87, p < :05),
meaning a zero-inated negative binomial is the correct model for the data.
9These models were estimated in STATA 12.1, and I estimated the post-estimation
predictions with the S-post 9 package (Long and Freese, 2006).
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Table 4.3: Zero-Inated Negative Binomial Models of Party Salience, 2004
Republicans Democrats
Count Ination Count Ination
Intercept  0:56  8:12 0:44 1:42
(0:35) (13:35) (0:29) (0:94)
Party ID 0:13  0:13  0:03 0:15
(0:13) (:09) (0:01) (:09)
Polarization 0:04  0:51 0:03  0:55
(0:02) (0:18) (0:02) (0:15)
Interest (Medium) 0:02  1:30 0:14  0:66
(0:15) (0:40) (0:11) (0:37)
Interest (High) 0:19  3:06 0:35  1:51
(0:15) (0:76) (0:11) (0:43)
Age 0:00  0:03  0:00  0:01
(0:00) (0:01) (0:00) (0:01)
Male 0:16  0:71 0:09  0:28
(:06) (0:41) (0:06) (0:31)
White 0:04 0:19  0:03 0:06
(0:08) (0:49) (0:07) (0:39)
South  0:16  0:71  0:09 0:11
(0:06) (0:66) (:07) (0:36)
Education (No Diploma) 0:78 11:21 0:21  0:66
(0:33) (13:40) (0:26) (0:92)
Education (High School) 0:81 11:19 0:36 0:17
(0:30) (13:35) (0:23) (0:70)
Education (Some College) 1:07 11:23 0:40 0:05
(0:30) (13:31) (0:23) (0:70)
Education (Bachelors) 1:17 10:60 0:58  0:91
(0:30) (13:46) (0:24) (0:92)
Education (Grad Degree) 1:25 10:50 0:61  0:18
(0:30) (13:34) (0:23) (0:87)
Income (33rd Percentile) 0:01  0:17  0:29  0:99
(0:12) (0:58) (0:12) (0:54)
Income (67th Percentile) 0:10 0:30  0:09  0:55
(0:11) (0:43) (0:11) (0:42)
Income (95th Percentile) 0:09  0:32  0:04  0:61
(0:11) (0:60) (0:11) (0:71)
Income (100th Percentile) 0:21  0:11  0:00  0:65
(0:13) (0:75) (0:13) (0:71)
log   2:80  2:79
(0:53) (0:52)
 0:06 0:06
(0:03) (0:03)
Total N 949 949
Non-zero N 695 707
Zero N 254 242
logPsuedoL  1614:42  16884:25
Robust standard errors in parentheses
 indicates signicance at p < 0:05
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licans and Democrats respectively. Because the polarization variable is unrelated to
the count portion of the model.10 I refrain from interpreting this model further.
Table 4.4 presents the zero-inated negative binomial model results of party
salience for both Republicans and Democrats during the 1992 election. In contrast
to the 2004 models, the polarization variable is statistically signicant in both the
count and ination portions of these two models.11 This means that voters who view
greater levels of polarization between the two parties are more likely to provide a hi-
gher number of comments about Republicans and Democrats than are voters who
see lower levels of polarization within the party system. Additionally, voters who see
high levels of polarization between the two parties are also less likely to be included
in always no comments (always zero) group than are voters who see low levels of
polarization between the two major parties.
For example, the Republican Party salience model for 1992 suggests that an aver-
age 40 year old who identies as a strong Republican and sees no polarization between
the two parties has a 0.51 probability of being included in the always no comments
group (always zero group), but an average 40 year old who identies as a strong Re-
publican and sees the maximum level of polarization between the two parties has a
0.05 probability of being in the always no comments group (always zero group). An
average 40 year old Democrat who sees no polarization between the two parties has
a 0.38 probability of being included in the always no comments group, but a 40 year
old Democrat who sees the maximum level of polarization between the two parties
10I also estimated these two models with an interaction between polarization and
party identication, but the term was not statistically signicant in either portion of
the model
11I also estimated each of these models with an interaction between polarization and
party identication. However this term was not statistically signicant. As result, I
do not report these models.
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Table 4.4: Zero-Inated Negative Binomial Models of Party Salience, 1992
Republicans Democrats
Count Ination Count Ination
Intercept 0:26 1:21 0:35 1:89
(0:17) (:63) (0:16) (0:79)
Party ID 0:01 0:09  0:05 0:20
(0:01) (0:04) (0:01) (0:06)
Polarization 0:06  0:49 0:07  0:58
(:02) (0:08) (0:02) (0:10)
Interest (Medium) 0:17  0:44 0:28  0:28
(0:09) (0:25) (0:09) (0:28)
Interest (High) 0:31  1:34 0:39  0:92
(0:10) (0:32) (0:09) (0:33)
Age  0:00  0:02  0:00  0:45
(0:00) (0:01) (0:00) (0:01)
Male 0:18  0:40 0:13  0:70
(0:04) (0:19) (0:04) (0:21)
White 0:01 0:18 0:11 0:33
(0:06) (0:26) (0:05) (0:27)
South  0:06 0:19  0:05  0:10
(0:05) (0:23) (0:04) (0:24)
Education (No Diploma)  0:05  0:16 0:03  0:32
(0:14) (0:44) (0:11) (0:47)
Education (High School)  0:07  0:47  0:02  0:51
(0:12) (0:44) (0:11) (0:51)
Education (Some College) 0:11  0:92 0:11  1:30
(0:13) (0:47) (0:11) (0:58)
Education (Bachelors) 0:24  1:25 0:30  1:51
(0:13) (0:50) (0:11) (0:59)
Education (Grad Degree) 0:29  1:40 0:45  1:27
(0:13) (0:61) (0:11) (0:67)
Income (33rd Percentile)  0:05 0:35  0:11 0:42
(0:09) (0:32) (0:08) (0:38)
Income (67th Percentile) 0:05 0:70  0:01 0:51
(0:08) (0:30) (0:08) (0:36)
Income (95th Percentile) 0:14 0:50 0:06 0:56
(0:08) (0:30) (0:08) (0:38)
Income (100th Percentile) 0:20  0:55 0:21 0:14
(0:10) (0:71) (0:10) (0:58)
log   3:22  3:04
(0:48) (0:42)
 0:04 0:05
(0:02) (0:03)
Total N 1807 1807
Non-zero N 1261 1261
Zero N 546 546
logPsuedoL  3093:28  3114:94
Robust standard errors in parentheses
 indicates signicance at p < 0:05
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has a 0.03 probability of being placed in the always no comments category, all else
equal. The pattern holds for Independents as well. An average 40 year old who iden-
ties as an a pure Independent and sees no polarization between the two parties has
a 0.45 chance of being included in the always no comments group, but an average 40
year old Independent who sees the maximum level of polarization between the two
parties has a 0.04 probability of being included in the always no comments category.
Figure 4.5 illustrates how moving from the minimum value of polarization to the
maximum value of polarization impacts the probability of never providing comments
about the Republican Party (the always zero category) during the 1992 election.
Each of the three colored lines represent the mean predicted probability of never
providing any comments about the Republican Party for voters who are 40 years old
and identify as Strong Republicans, Independents, and Strong Democrats. All other
predictors in the model were held at their mean or modal value depending on their
level of measurement.12
This gure indicates that under little or no polarization all three types of parti-
sans have a similar probability of never providing any comments about the Republican
Party during the 1992 election. Strong Republicans have a slightly higher probability
of never providing any comments about their party than do Independents or Strong
Democrats among voters who see no polarization between the two parties, but the
dierence in these predicted probabilities is rather small. For instance, the dier-
ence in the probability between Strong Republicans and Strong Democrats under no
polarization is roughly 0.10.
12The predicted probabilities are slightly dierent the the predicted probabilities
in the preceding paragraphs. This is due to the the dierent estimations commands
used in STATA to estimate the conditional probabilities. The commands used to
produce the graphing parameters in STATA 12.1 are not as exible as the estimation
commands in the S-Post Package.
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Figure 4.5: Republican Party Salience Predictions, 1992
Among average voters who see a maximum level of polarization between the two
parties, the probability of never providing any comments about the Republican Party
during the 1992 election decreases considerably. Under this scenario, all three types of
partisans { Strong Republicans, Independents, and Strong Democrats { have about a
0.10 probability of never voicing an opinion about the party, all else equal. The predic-
tions from this model suggest that polarization is an important factor that increases
the likelihood that voters will provide additional comments about the Republican
Party during their post election ANES interviews.
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The model for the Democrats suggests a similar relationship between polarization
and party salience during the 1992 election. The results of this model are published in
Table 4.4. To reiterate, both variables of interest { party identication and polariza-
tion { are statistically signicant in this model. Additionally, the eect of these two
variables is in the expected direction. The overall trends suggested by this model are
similar to the Republican Salience Model for 1992, and moving from the minimum
value to the maximum value of polarization reduces the probability of never providing
any comments about the Democratic Party for all types of partisans.
For example, an average 40 year old who identies as a strong Republican and
sees no polarization between the two parties has a 0.60 probability of inclusion in the
always zero category, all else equal. However, an average 40 year old who identies as a
strong Republican who sees a maximum amount of polarization between the two par-
ties has a 0.05 probability of never providing comments about the Democratic Party.
An average voter 40 year old voter who identies as a strong Democrat and sees no
polarization between the two parties has a 0.32 probability of never providing com-
ments about the Democratic Party, but a comparable voter who sees the maximum
level of polarization between the two parties has 0.01 probability of never providing
comments about the Democratic Party. A 40 year old voter who sees identies as an
Independent and sees no polarization between the two parties has a 0.45 probability of
never providing any comments about the Democratic Party, but a comparable voter
who sees the maximum level of polarization between the parties has a 0.02 probability
of being included in the always zero category, all else equal.
One major dierence between the Republican Aect model and the Democratic
aect model is that the rate of change in predicted probabilities between Strong Re-
publicans, Independents, and Strong Democrats is dierent across these three groups
as polarization moves from the minimum value to the maximum value. Figure 4.6 ill-
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Figure 4.6: Democratic Party Salience Predictions, 1992
ustrates this relationship. Each of the three colored lines represent the mean predicted
probability of never providing any comments about the Democratic Party for voters
who are 40 years old and identify as Strong Republicans, Independents, and Strong
Democrats during their interviews. All other predictors in the model were held at
their mean or modal value depending on their level of measurement.13
13The predicted probabilities are slightly dierent the the predicted probabilities
in the preceding paragraphs. This is due to the the dierent estimations commands
used in STATA to estimate the conditional probabilities. The commands used to
produce the graphing parameters in STATA 12.1 are not as exible as the estimation
commands in the S-Post Package.
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As with the Republican Aect model, Strong Republicans are the most likely of
the three partisan types to never provide any comments about the Democratic Party,
but they also have the steepest rate of change in predicted probabilities as polarization
moves from its minimum to maximum value. Figure 4.6 suggests that the polarization
polarization variable has the strongest impact on Democratic Party salience for Strong
Republicans. As polarization moves from the minimum to maximum value, Strong
Republicans are much more likely to provide comments about the Democratic Party
during their post-election ANES interviews.
For Independents, the relationship between polarization and Democratic Party
salience is similar, but the change in predicted probabilities is much less pronounced.
Under the no polarization condition, Independents have a roughly equal probability
of always being included in the always no comments category, but as polarization
increases to its maximum value, Independents are slightly less likely than Strong
Republicans to never provide any comments about the Democratic Party during their
post-election ANES interviews. For Strong Democrats, the rate of change in predicted
probabilities as polarization moves from its minimum to maximum value is much less
than it is for the other two types of partisans. The much atter blue line in Figure 4.6
suggests this relationship. However, as with Strong Republicans and Independents,
moving from no polarization to the maximum level of polarization signicantly reduces
the probability that a Strong Democrat will never provide any comments about the
Democratic Party.
Table 4.5 reports the zero-inated negative binomial models estimates of party
salience for the 1972 election. The party identication variable is not statistically
signicant in either of these two models, meaning that strength of party identication
is unrelated to providing comments about either party during the 1972 election. The
polarization variable is statistically signicant for for the Republican model, but it is
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Table 4.5: Zero-Inated Negative Binomial Models of Party Salience, 1972
Republicans Democrats
Count Ination Count Ination
Intercept  0:05 1:67 0:26 1:51
(0:25) (0:84) (0:29) (1:91)
Party ID 0:03 0:03  0:03 0:17
(0:01) (0:07) (0:02) (0:09)
Polarization 0:03  0:42 0:03  0:31
(0:03) (0:13) (0:03) (0:20)
Interest (Medium) 0:05  0:46  0:03  0:79
(0:13) (0:43) (0:12) (0:49)
Interest (High) 0:19  0:53 0:12  1:39
(0:13) (0:47) (0:12) (0:62)
Age 0:00  0:04 0:01  0:04
(0:00) (0:01) (:00) (0:01)
Male 0:12  0:13 0:02  0:30
(0:11) (0:32) (0:07) (0:43)
White  0:11  0:00 0:03 0:27
(0:11) (0:57) (0:14) (1:06)
South 0:08 0:34 0:12 0:92
(0:08) (0:35) (0:10) (0:63)
Education (No Diploma) 0:35  0:04 0:16  0:27
(0:17) (0:62) (0:16) (0:91)
Education (High School) 0:31  0:37 0:22  0:61
(0:14) (0:58) (0:14) (0:91)
Education (Some College) 0:45  0:41 0:17  1:43
(0:17) (0:64) (0:16) (1:17)
Education (Bachelors) 0:49  1:35 0:38  1:07
(0:17) (0:82) (0:17) (1:12)
Education (Grad Degree) 0:65  0:89 0:57  0:84
(0:17) (0:83) (0:18) (1:33)
Income (33rd Percentile)  0:18  0:99  0:16  1:71
(0:16) (1:04) (0:18) (2:04)
Income (67th Percentile) 0:06 0:23 0:09  0:16
(0:13) (0:50) (0:14) (0:69)
Income (95th Percentile) 0:19  0:29 0:04  0:85
(0:13) (0:55) (0:15) (0:81)
Income (100th Percentile) 0:15 0:31  0:09  0:43
(0:16) (0:72) (0:19) (1:26)
log   14:42  4:17
(8:05) (2:05)
 0:00 0:02
(0:00) (0:03)
Total N 679 679
Non-zero N 482 504
Zero N 197 175
logPsuedoL  1151:11  1161:97
Robust standard errors in parentheses
 indicates signicance at p < 0:05
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only signicant in the ination portion of the model. Because these results are not
robust, I refrain from interpreting the model further.
4.3 Voter Turnout
The preceding two sections describe how polarization aects party assessments
in terms of salience and aect. How voters evaluate the party system are important
components of whether they decide or not to vote. In this section, I address whether
polarization aects whether voters actually cast a vote. The ANES asks voters a
series of questions about their voting behavior in national elections. One question
consistently asked in the ANES was whether a respondent voted in the national
elections. In order to better understand how polarization inuences the decision to
vote or not vote, I make use of the 2012, 1992, and 1972 subsets of the ANES CDF.
A binary choice model is an intuitive path to select when comparing the outcomes
of a dichotomous dependent variable. However, traditional options, such as the stan-
dard logit or probit model, do not account for the unequal error variances found in
these voter turnout models. In the generalized linear model framework, hetereoskedas-
ticity causes both bias and ineciency in the coecient estimates. A heteroskedastic
probit model relaxes the unit variance assumption of the the traditional model, and
it allows some of the error variance to depend on particular predictors in the model.
I make use of this modeling strategy in the remainder of this section.14
Table 4.6 contains the results for the voter turnout for the three selected elections.
In 2012, both the party identication and polarization variables are statistically sig-
14The age variable is the source of the heteroskedastic errors. A series of resid-
ual diagnostics revealed this variable as the culprit. Additionally, including age in
the variance component produces a statistically signicant term, indicating that a
modied choice model is appropriate.
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Table 4.6: Heteroskedastic Probit Models of Voter Turnout
2012 1992 1972
Intercept  0:01  0:19 0:05
(0:04) (0:16) (0:12)
Party ID  0:01  0:05 0:00
(0:00) (0:02) (0:01)
Polarization 0:04 0:06 0:03
(0:01) (0:02) (0:02)
Interest (Medium) 0:36 0:13
(0:10) (0:07)
Interest (High) 0:00 0:71 0:30
(0:02) (0:14) (0:09)
Male  0:04  0:02 0:03
(0:02) (0:06) (0:05)
White 0:01 0:11 0:02
(0:02) (0:08) (0:09)
South  0:03  0:22  0:19
(0:20) (0:07) (0:06)
Education (No Diploma) 0:03  0:22 0:07
(0:05) (0:15) (0:07)
Education (High School) 0:10 0:16 0:13
(0:05) (0:12) (0:07)
Education (Some College) 0:18 0:40 0:27
(0:05) (0:14) (0:09)
Education (Bachelors) 0:15 0:48 0:34
(0:03) (0:15) (0:10)
Education (Grad Degree) 0:18 0:76 0:31
(0:06) (0:22) (0:14)
Income (33rd Percentile) 0:01 0:11 0:12
(0:03) (0:10) (0:08)
Income (67th Percentile) 0:09 0:19 0:21
(0:02) (0:10) (0:07)
Income (95th Percentile) 0:15 0:39 0:31
(0:03) (0:11) (0:08)
Income (100th Percentile) 0:18 0:48 0:31
(0:06) (0:21) (0:14)
log 
Age  0:02  0:01  0:01
(0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
N 5016 1649 1347
Standard errors in parentheses
 indicates signicance at p < 0:05
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nicant, and each of these variables are signed in the expected direction.15 The model
suggests that polarization does increase the likelihood that a voter will cast a ballot
in the election.
To better understand the magnitude that polarization has on the likelihood of
voting. It is necessary to look at some predictions from the model because coecients
from a generalized linear model are not directly interpretable. Figure 4.7 contains the
mean probability of voting with the associated 95% condence intervals. The graph
shows that the probability of voting increases when moving from no polarization to
high level of polarization for Republicans, Independents, and Democrats alike. For
example, a 40 year old, non-southern, white, male who has a high level of interest in
campaign and identies as a strong Republican has a 0.66 probability of voting in the
election if he sees no polarization between the two parties. By contrast a comparable
man who sees the maximum level of polarization between the two parties has a 0.84
probability of voting in the 2012 election, all else equal.
The trend holds for Independents and Democrats as well. An Independent with
the same social characteristics as the previously mentioned Republican has a 0.68
probability of voting when he sees no polarization between the parties; however,
a comparable Independent who sees a maximum level of polarization between the
two parties has a 0.85 probability of voting. A Democrat with these same social
characteristics who sees no polarization between the two parties has a 0.71 probability
of voting in the election, but if a socially similar Democrat that sees a maximum level
of polarization between the two parties has a 0.87 probability of casting a ballot in
the election.
15I also estimated this model with an interaction term between party identication
and polarization; however, this model was not statistically signicant.
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Figure 4.7: Voter Turnout Predictions by Party, 2012
The previous gure shows how the probability of voting changes across dierent
dierent levels of polarization for dierent types of partisans. The relationship be-
tween polarization and voting can also been seen across dierent education levels.
Figure 4.8 illustrates the dierences in the probability of voting between a hypothet-
ical voter who has a high school education versus a similar voter with a bachelors
degree. The gure shows the mean probability of voting with the 95% condence in-
tervals varying by education. Consider, a 40 year old, white, non-southern, male who
identies as an Independent and sees no polarization between the two parties has a
0.55 probability of voting in a congressional election. By contrast, a similar voter who
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Figure 4.8: Voter Turnout Predictions by Education, 2012
sees a maximum level of polarization between the Republican and Democratic
parties has a 0.77 probability of casting a ballot for a member of Congress. A so-
cially similar voter with a college degree has 0.68 probability of voting when he sees
no polarization between the two parties, but a similar college graduate has a 0.86
probability of voting, considering other relevant factors.
Figure 4.9 shows how polarization aects the probability of voting across the age
variable.16 Under a low polarization scenario (polarization = 0), a 40 year old, non-
16As with the other voter turnout plots, the gure shows the mean probability of
voting with the 95% condence intervals.
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Figure 4.9: Voter Turnout Predictions by Age, 2012
southern, white male with a bachelors degree who identies as an Independent has
a 0.76 probability of voting the 2012 election. Whereas, a socially similar voter who
sees a medium amount of conict between the parties (polarization = 3) has a 0.86
probability of making their electoral preferences known. When a demographically
similar voter sees the maximum amount of polarization (polarization = 6), they have
a 0.93 probability of voting.
There are two other interesting ndings that appear from the conditional probabil-
ities depicted in Figure 4.8. First, when comparing the low polarization condition to
the high polarization condition, the probability that a younger voter (20 years of age)
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increases by 0.25. Second, while the mean probability of voting does not change as
drastically for older Americans when moving from low polarization to the maximum
value of polarization, the uncertainty around their estimates decreases considerably,
which is evidenced by the increasingly narrow condence intervals across the dierent
values of polarization.
The results for the 1992 voter turnout model are relatively similar to the 2012
results. In this model both party identication and polarization are statistically sig-
nicant, and each coecient is signed in the expected direction.17 As with the 2012
model, the positive polarization coecient suggests that it increases the likelihood
that a voter will cast a ballot during the 1992 election.
Figure 4.10 shows how the probability of voting changes as polarization moves
from its minimum value to its maximum value for Republicans, Independents, and
Democrats during the 1992 election.18 In contrast to the 2012 results, the change
in probability of voting is not as drastic; however, the change is still statistically
signicant and substantively meaningful. A 40 year old, white, non-southern male
who identies as a Republican has a 0.86 probability of voting in the 1992 election
under the no polarization condition. A comparable Republican who sees a maximum
level of polarization between the two parties has 0.94 probability of casting a ballot,
all else equal.
The trend is also similar for both Independents and Democrats. A socially similar
Independent has 0.90 probability of voting under the no polarization condition, and
a comparable Independent who is average on other characteristics has a 0.96 voting
during the 1992 election. In a similar vein, a 40 year old, white, non-southern male
17I also estimated a model with an interaction term between party identication
and polarization; however, the term was not statistically signicant.
18The gure shows the mean probability of voting with the 95% condence intervals.
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Figure 4.10: Voter Turnout Predictions by Party, 1992
who identies as a Democrat and sees no polarization between the two parties has
a 0.93 probability of voting in the 1992 election. However, a similar Democrat who
sees the maximum level of polarization between the two parties has 0.98 probability
of casting a ballot in the 1992 congressional election.
Figure 4.11 shows the relationship between polarization and the probability of
voting broken down my education level.19 As with the 2012 model, the 1992 model
compares a high school graduate to a college graduate. A 40 year old, white, non-
19The gure shows the mean probability of voting with the associated 95% con-
dence intervals.
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Figure 4.11: Voter Turnout Predictions by Education, 1992
southern male who identies as an Independent has a 0.69 probability of voting during
the 1992 election at the minimum level of polarization, but as polarization moves to
it's maximum value, a demographically similar voter has a 0.83 probability of voting,
ceteris paribus.
By contrast, a college graduate with similar social characteristics has a 0.90 prob-
ability of voting during the 1992 under the no polarization scenario, but a comparable
college graduate has a 0.96 probability of voting when he sees the maximum amount
of polarization between the two parties. The change in probability is small, but it is
statistically signicant and substantively important.
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Figure 4.12: Voter Turnout Predictions by Age, 1992
Figure 4.12 illustrates how polarization changes the probability of voting during
the 1992 election across the age variable.20 A 40 year old, white, non-southern, male
with a bachelors degree and who identies as an Independent and sees no polarization
between the two parties has a 0.93 probability of voting during the 1992 election.
However, a comparable voter who sees a medium level of distance between the two
parties (polarization = 3) has a 0.96 probability of voting in the 1992 election. A
20The gure shows the mean probability of voting with the associated 95% con-
dence interval.
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socially similar voter who sees the maximum level of polarization between the two
parties a has a 0.99 probability of voting, considering other important factors.
The 1972 voter turnout model does not suggest that polarization was an important
factor during this election. The coecient is signed in the expected direction, but
the estimates do not achieve statistical signicance by any conventional standard.21
Because the main variable of interest is not signicant, I refrain from elaborating in
this model further.
4.4 Vote Choice
In the previous sections, I demonstrated that polarization inuences how voters
evaluate the party system, and that it increases the probability of voting for all
types of partisans for two of the three selected elections. Considering these results,
a natural question arises: Do either of the parties receive an electoral advantage due
to a more polarized party system? The results of the analyses in this section are
mixed in this respect. During the 2012 election, the Democrats received an electoral
advantage from polarization in the both the House and the Senate races. However,
the Republicans received an electoral advantage from polarization for the 1992 Senate
races. Polarization, however, seems less of a factor in House races for the time periods
chosen for these analyses.
The ANES furnishes vote choice variables that asks voters whether they voted for
the Democratic or Republican candidate for both the Senate and the House of Rep-
resentatives. These questions are a staple of the ANES timeseries data le, meaning
that they have been asked consistently over time. In order to determine how polar-
ization interacts with vote choice, I make use of the 2012, 1992, and 1972 subsets of
the ANES CDF.
21The coecient neither meets the p=.05 nor p=.10 standard of signicance.
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4.4.1 Senate Elections
Table 4.7 presents the results for Senate vote choice models during the 2012, 1992,
and 1972 elections. Each of these models tests whether voters prefer Democratic Sen-
ate candidates to Republican Senate candidates. I estimated a series of logit models
to account for the binary nature of the dependent variable. Unlike the voter turnout
models, the data generation mechanism for the Senate vote choice models does not
contain a heteroskedastic component. As with the other models in this chapter, I
incorporated the sampling weights furnished by ANES into the analyses, and the
standard error of the estimates were adjusted via Taylor Series Approximation.
During the 2012 election, several variables prove to be important predictors of
Senate vote choice. Party identication, polarization, and the interaction term be-
tween party identication and polarization are statistically signicant. As with the
other models, party identication is signed in the expected direction, which indicates
that Republicans are less likely to support Democratic Senate candidates than are
Democrats. The positive coecient for the polarization term suggests that as polar-
ization rises, voters are more likely to prefer the Democratic Senate candidate, all
else equal. The signicant interaction term suggests that polarization does not aect
all partisans equally when it comes to selecting their Senators.
To better understand how each of these variables relate to vote choice it is neces-
sary to look at the model's predictions. Figure 4.13 displays the probability of voting
for a Democratic Senate candidate during the 2012 election.22 A 40 year old, white,
non-southern, male who identies as a Republican has about a 0.06 probability of
voting for the Democratic Senate candidate in his state if he sees no polarization
between the parties. A comparable Republican who sees the maximum amount of po-
22The gure shows the mean probability of voting for a Democratic Senate candidate
with the 95% condence intervals.
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Table 4.7: Logit Models of Senate Vote Choice
2012 1992 1972
Intercept 2:54 2:03 1:47
(0:90) (0:91) (0:78)
Party ID  0:75  0:34  0:40
(0:14) (0:10) (0:10)
Polarization 0:45 0:33 0:11
(0:16) (0:15) (0:14)
Interest (Medium) 0:20 0:43
(0:41) (0:33)
Interest (High)  0:43 0:67 0:50
(0:16) (0:41) (0:33)
Age 0:01  0:00  0:01
(0:00) (0:01) (0:01)
Male  0:15  0:03 0:20
(0:16) (0:18) (0:21)
White  0:63  0:56  0:43
(0:20) (0:29) (0:39)
South  0:49 0:78 0:63
(0:18) (0:25) (0:22)
Education (No Diploma)  0:04 0:01 0:11
(0:80) (0:59) (0:41)
Education (High School) 0:79  0:04 0:27
(0:73) (0:51) (0:38)
Education (Some College) 1:01  0:25 0:37
(0:74) (0:52) (0:41)
Education (Bachelors) 0:74 0:01 0:31
(0:74) (0:54) (0:45)
Education (Grad Degree) 0:88  0:11 0:55
(0:74) (0:56) (0:51)
Income (33rd Percentile) 0:13  0:17  0:48
(0:29) (0:39) (0:44)
Income (67th Percentile) 0:17  0:37 0:00
(0:22) (0:37) (0:34)
Income (95th Percentile) 0:05  0:14  0:36
(0:23) (0:38) (0:34)
Income (100th Percentile)  0:05 0:12  1:01
(0:30) (0:50) (0:51)
Party ID * Polarization  0:09  0:10  0:05
(0:04) (0:03) (0:04)
N 2715 788 557
Standard errors in parentheses
 indicates signicance at p < 0:05
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Figure 4.13: Senate Vote Choice Among Strong Partisans, 2012
larization between the parties has a 0.02 probability of voting for the Democratic
Senate candidate, all else equal. In other words, voters who identify as strong Repub-
licans have almost no chance of voting for the Democratic Senate candidate in their
state. However, moving from the minimum to the maximum value of polarization,
even among strong Republicans, still produces a statistically signicant change in
probability of voting for a Democratic Senate candidate.
By contrast, a 40 year old, white, non-southern, male who identies as a Democrat
has a 0.85 probability of voting for the Democratic Senate candidate when he sees no
polarization between the two parties. A comparable Democrat who sees the maximum
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Figure 4.14: Senate Vote Choice Among Independents, 2012
amount of polarization between the parties has a 0.99 probability of voting for the
Democratic Senate candidate. The change in probability from the minimum value
of polarization to the maximum value of polarization is slightly greater for a strong
Democrat than it is for a strong Republicans. However, the result is basically the
same: Strong Democrats are almost always going to vote for their party's candidate,
and polarization simply reinforces this basic tendency.
The most striking instance of change is how polarization aects the vote choice of
Independents. Figure 4.14 shows the probability of voting for the Democratic Senate
candidate among Republican leaning Independents, Pure Independents, and Demo-
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cratic leaning Independents.23 A 40 year old, white, non-southern, male who identies
as a Republican leaning Independent and sees no polarization between the parties has
a 0.23 probability of voting for the Democratic Senate. However, a comparable Repub-
lican leaning Independent who sees a maximum amount of polarization between the
two parties has 0.25 probability of voting for the Democratic candidate, considering
other relevant factors. A similar voter who identies as a pure Independent has a 0.39
probability of voting for the Democratic Senate candidate under the no polarization
scenario, but a socially similar pure Independent has a 0.55 probability of voting for
the Democratic Senate candidate, all else equal.
The greatest amount of change in the probability of voting for a Democratic
Senate candidate comes from Independents who lean toward the Democratic Party.
For a 40 year old, white, non-Southern male who identies as a Democratic leaning
independent and sees no polarization between the parties has a 0.57 probability of
voting for the Democratic Senate candidate. By contrast a similar voter who sees
the maximum amount of polarization between the two parties has 0.82 probability of
voting for the Democratic candidate.
The vote choice model for the 1992 is largely the same as the 2012 model. Both
Party identication and polarization are statistically signicant, and the coecients
are signed in the hypothesized direction. Again, the positive polarization coecient
suggests that when voters see a higher level of polarization Democratic Senate candi-
dates benet electorally. As with the 2012 model, it is necessary to assess the model's
predictions in order to fully understand how polarization interacts with vote choice.
23The gure shows the mean probability of voting for the Democratic Senate can-
didate with the 95% condence intervals.
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Figure 4.15 displays the vote choice predictions among strong partisans for the
1992 election.24 A 40 year old, white, non-southern, male who identies as a strong
Republican has a 0.33 probability of voting for the Democratic candidate when he
sees no polarization between the parties. However, a comparable Republican who
sees the maximum amount of polarization between the parties has 0.05 probability
of voting for the Democratic candidate. Whereas, a similar voter who identies as a
strong Democrat and sees no polarization between the parties has a 0.79 probability
of voting for the Democratic Senate candidate, and a comparable Democrat who sees
the maximum amount of polarization between the parties has a 0.94 probability of
voting for their party's Senate candidate, ceteris paribus.
Figure 4.16 contains the vote choice predictions among Independents for the 1992
election.25 As with the 2012 election, the 1992 vote choice model's most interesting
predictions emerge among voters who call themselves Independents. In contrast to
the 2012 election, the change in probability is in the opposite direction for the 1992
election. In other words, Republican Senate candidates received an electoral advantage
among voters who see the party system as polarized for this election. For instance,
A 40 year old, white, non-southern, male who identies as a Republican leaning
Independent and sees no polarization between the two parties has a 0.48 probability
of voting for the Democratic candidate. However, a comparable partisan who see the
maximum amount of polarization between the two parties has a 0.25 probability of
voting for the Democratic Senate candidate.
For a demographically similar pure Independent who sees no polarization between
the parties, they have 0.57 probability of voting for the Democratic Senate candidate.
24The gure shows the mean probability of voting for the Democratic Senate can-
didate with the 95% condence interval.
25The gure shows the mean probability of voting for the Democratic Senate can-
didate with the 95% condence intervals.
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Figure 4.15: Senate Vote Choice Among Strong Partisans, 1992
By contrast, a similar pure Independent who see the maximum amount of polariza-
tion between the parties has a 0.47 probability of voting for the Democratic Senate
candidate. The change in probability among Democratic leaning Independents is rel-
atively at. A Democratic leaning Independent who mirrors the social characteristics
of the other Independents and sees no polarization between the two parties has a 0.65
probability of voting for the Democratic Senate candidate. Whereas, a comparable
voter who sees the maximum amount of polarization between the two parties has a
0.69 probability of voting for a Democratic Senate candidate.
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Figure 4.16: Senate Vote Choice Among Independents, 1992
Returning to the results in Table 4.7, the voter choice model suggests that po-
larization is unrelated to vote choice for the 1972 election. The coecients for party
identication and polarization are in the expected direction. However, the estimates
are not statistically signicant. As result, I refrain from further elaboration of this
model.
4.4.2 House of Representatives Elections
Table 4.8 shows the results for a series of vote choice models for the House of
Representatives. As with the Senate models, these models predict whether a voter
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Table 4.8: Logit Models of House Vote Choice
2012 1992 1972
Intercept 4:47 3:86 3:86
(0:70) (0:70) (0:70)
Party ID  1:09  0:59  0:59
(0:05) (0:04) (0:04)
Polarization 0:12  0:05  0:05
(0:05) (0:05) (0:05)
Interest (High)  0:15 0:50 0:50
(0:15) (0:30) (0:30)
Interest (Medium) 0:56 0:56
(0:30) (0:30)
Age  0:01  0:00  0:00
(0:00) (0:01) (0:01)
White  0:85  0:59  0:59
(0:17) (0:28) (0:28)
South  0:53  0:30  0:30
(0:15) (0:19) (0:19)
Education (No Diploma) 1:00  0:87  0:87
(0:70) (0:55) (0:55)
Education (High School) 0:48  0:58  0:58
(0:62) (0:47) (0:47)
Education (Some College) 0:81  0:50  0:50
(0:63) (0:48) (0:48)
Education (Bachelors) 0:74  0:75  0:75
(0:64) (0:49) (0:49)
Education (Graduate Degree) 1:17  0:00  0:00
(0:64) (0:51) (0:51)
Income (33rd Percentile) 0:01 0:09 0:09
(0:29) (0:35) (0:35)
Income (67th Percentile)  0:47  0:41  0:41
(0:24) (0:32) (0:32)
Income (95th Percentile)  0:05  0:40  0:40
(0:27) (0:32) (0:32)
Income (100th Percentile) 0:34  1:50  1:50
(0:34) (0:42) (0:42)
N 3383 1095 1095
Standard errors in parentheses
 indicates signicance at p < 0:05
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will cast a ballot for the Democratic or Republican candidate in their House district.
During the 2012 election, both the party identication and polarization variables are
statistically signicant, and each of these variable are signed in the expected direction.
However, to fully understand how these variables inuence vote choice it is necessary
to look at the model's predictions.
Figure 4.17 show the probability of voting for the Democratic House candidate
during the 2012 election among strong partisans.26 The gure largely shows what we
know to be true among strong partisans: They almost always vote for their party's
candidate. For example, a 40 year old, white, non-southern, male who identies as a
strong Republican and sees no polarization between the two parties has a 0.01 prob-
ability of voting for the Democratic candidate. However, a comparable Republican
who sees a maximum level of polarization has a 0.03 probability of voting for the
Democratic candidate. Despite the statistically signicant change in probability, the
substantive interpretation of this model is aectively the same: These two Republicans
are incredibly unlikely to vote for the Democratic House candidate.
By contrast, a 40 year old, white, non-southern, male who identies as a strong
Democrat and sees no polarization between the two parties has a 0.94 probability of
voting for the Democratic House candidate. A demographically similar voter who sees
the maximum amount of polarization between the two parties has a 0.96 probability
of voting for his party's candidate. As with the two hypothetical Republican voters,
these two Democrats will almost always vote for the Democratic House candidate, all
else equal.
The change in probability of voting for the Democratic House candidate is some-
what dierent among Independent voters. Figure 4.18 reports the results for Inde-
26The gure shows the mean probability of voting for the Democratic House candi-
date with 95% condence intervals.
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Figure 4.17: House of Representatives Vote Choice Among Strong Partisans, 2012
pendent voters.27 Unlike the strong partisans, all three groups of Independent voters
have a greater probability of voting for the Democratic candidate as polarization
approaches its maximum value. For example, a 40 year old, white, non-southern,
male who identies as a Republican leaning Independent and sees no polarization
between the two parties has a 0.12 probability of voting for the Democratic candidate.
Whereas, a socially similar Republican leaning Independent has a 0.22 probability of
casting a ballot for the Democratic House candidate.
27The gure shows the mean probability of voting for the Democratic House candi-
date with 95% condence intervals.
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Figure 4.18: House of Representatives Vote Choice Among Independents, 2012
A pure Independent who shares similar characteristics as the previously mentioned
voter and sees no polarization between the two parties has a 0.28 probability of
voting for the Democratic House candidate, but a pure Independent who mirror this
demographic description and sees a maximum amount of polarization between the two
parties has a 0.45 probability of voting for the Democratic House candidate, ceteris
paribus.
The Democratic leaning Independents are similarly aected by polarization as
are pure Independents. A 40 year old, white, non-southern, male who identies as
a Democratic leaning Independent and sees no polarization between the two parties
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has a 0.53 probability of voting for the Democratic House candidate. A comparable
voter who sees the maximum amount of polarization between the two parties has a
0.70 probability of voting for the Democratic House candidate, all else equal.
Returning to Table 4.8, The models for 1992 and 1972 show that polarization is
unrelated to House vote choice during these two elections. The coecients in each
of the respective models suggest a lower likelihood of voting for Democratic House
candidates. However, the estimates are not statistically signicant. As result, I refrain
from further elaboration of these two models.
4.5 Summary
The results in this chapter have shown several important things about polarization
and political behavior. First, polarization has a strong inuence on how strong parti-
sans evaluate the party system. Polarization caused these types of voters to provide
stronger evaluations of their party, and it caused them to have more negative eval-
uations of the other party. However, Independent partisans seemed to evaluate each
of the parties similarly regardless of whether they saw the party system polarized or
not. Additionally, polarization increased the number of comments that a voter would
provide amount each of the two major parties.
In terms of voter turnout, polarization increased the probability that voters would
cast a ballot in both House and Senate elections. These results held regardless of
partisan identication. All types of partisan saw an increase in the probability of
voting under a highly polarized party system. Additionally, these results held when
examining voters in terms of age and education level.
Finally, polarization signicantly impacted the vote choice of American citizens.
During the 2012 election, polarization increased the likelihood that independent voters
would chose the Democratic Senate and House candidates, but this result ipped for
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during 1992 election. Independent voters were more likely to prefer the Republican
Senate candidate during this election. No eect was found in the 1992 House contests.
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Chapter 5
MACRO-LEVEL POLARIZATION AND U.S. ELECTIONS
The previous chapters placed emphasis on how polarization aects the individual
voter. In this chapter, I change the unit of analysis to the U.S. states, and I focus on
aggregate measures of political behavior. The primary dataset used in this chapter
comes from the Correlates of State Policy Project (Jordan and Grossman, 2016).1
This project contains approximately 700 variables that provide economic, political,
and social measures for all 50 states spanning from 1900 - 2016.
5.1 Measuring Macro-level Voter Turnout
Despite the wealth of information contained in the entire Correlates project, I
make use of a subset of variables that pertain to voter turnout and legislative elections.
The dataset contains a voting-eligible measure of (VEP) of voter turnout that spans
from 1980 - 2012. This is an extension of the original VEP measure (McDonald, 2002).
The VEP turnout variable is estimated by two important components: the number
of ballots cast and the eligible voting population. The former component of the VEP
measure is calculated by tallying ballots cast for the state's highest oce. During
presidential election years, the presidency is the highest oce on the ballot, and this
is almost always the highest number of ballots cast during these years. In other years,
the highest number of state-wide ballots cast is used. For example, this is most often
the contest for U.S. Senate or the state's gubernatorial race. If no U.S. Senate or
gubernatorial race was held, the highest available oce total is the combination of
1This dataset is publicly available through The Institute for Public Policy and
Social Research which is housed at Michigan State University. The data may be found
by following this url: http://ippsr.msu.edu/public-policy/correlates-state-policy.
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U.S. House ballots cast. In 2006, McDonald began using the combination of U.S.
House ballots cast when these totals exceeded a U.S. Senate or gubernatorial race.
This decision provides a better estimate of voter turnout when contests for higher
oces are uncompetitive. Using the total number of ballots cast for the highest oce
is important because it places state-level turnout on the same scale, meaning that it
facilitates comparisons between states and across time.
There is one drawback of using ballots cast for the highest oce as the numerator
of the VEP measure: It only utilizes valid votes. Often, ballots are discounted due to
things such as registration problems, voters casting a ballot in the wrong polling place,
or people not following the procedural directions written on the ballot. The procedures
for dealing with these issues in the context of the election varies from state to state.
However, as a measure of raw participation, this strategy ignores ballots that were
disqualied, and it biases participation rates downward. A solution to this problem is
to used total ballots cast, which considers these errors when evaluating participation.
Despite the virtue of this alternative, not all states report the number of total ballots
cast. When available, McDonald incorporates this information.
The second important component of the VEP turnout measure is estimating the
number of eligible voters. Traditionally, this portion of the voter turnout measure is
calculated by using the voting-age population of each state or congressional district
through data from the U.S. Census Bureau. However, this estimate does not account
for the number of felons in each state, citizens who live abroad, or the number of
non-citizens living in a particular state or congressional district. The ineligible felon
population is estimated from data obtained from the U.S. Department of Justice,
which records the number of citizens on probation, on parole, and the number who are
currently incarcerated. These estimates are matched with data from the Sentencing
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Project which tracks the status of state disenfranchisement laws for those in prison,
on probation, or on parole.
The number of citizens living overseas are removed from the voter turnout calcu-
lation by using data from the U.S. Consular Service, the Federal Voting Assistance
Program, and the Department of Defense. These sources account for citizens and U.S.
military that claim a state of residence, but do not vote in the location that they claim
as a permanent residence.
Prior to 2000, McDonald interpolates the decennial census estimates to account for
non-citizens living in a particular state or congressional district. For years after 2000,
McDonald makes use of the American Community Survey to remove non-citizens
from the voting-age population. This method is slightly dierent than what he has
done in the past where he uses the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey to
account for the number of non-citizens. He makes this change because data from the
American Community Survey is published more frequently.2
The VEP measure of turnout is available for the 1980 - 2012 elections. The data
are not available prior to 1980 because of the lack of resources necessary to adjust the
voting-age population estimate. For instance, the Department of Justice only began
reporting complete correction statistics in 1978. Also, the Census Bureau did not
create a voting-age population measure for the 1950s or the 1970s; although, it did
for the 1960s.
5.2 Measuring the Predictors of Macro-level Voter Turnout
The Correlates dataset contains many useful state-level variables that help ex-
plain the variation in voter turnout. For instance, the the dataset contains variables
that measure the partisan and ideological tendencies of both the electorate and state
2For more information on this new calculation see McDonald (2011).
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legislatures for a good number of years. Additionally, the Correlates dataset contains
variables that allow for demographic controls such as income, education, and electoral
competitiveness.
5.2.1 Polarization
The Correlates data set contains two measures of state-level of polarization that
compares the level of polarization in each state's House of Representatives and in
each state's Senate. These are the same measures of polarization found in the work
of Shor and McCarty (2011). Their measures of polarization are called NPAT scores,
which were estimated by analyzing the roll-call votes of state legislators by tting a
multi-dimensional spatial model in each chamber of a state's legislature.3 As with the
roll-call analyses found for Congress, the rst dimension of the spatial model explains
almost all the variance in roll-call voting behavior. As with the literature in Congress,
they interpret this rst dimension of roll-call behavior as a direct measure of political
ideology.
In order to place these state-level estimates of ideology on a common scale,
Shor and McCarty utilized the Project Vote Smart National Political Aptitude Test
(NPAT). This is a survey of state legislators that measures their opinions about state
policies. The NPAT asks each state legislator the same questions regardless of their
state of residence or the chamber in which they serve. Additionally, the survey asks
most of the same questions over time. In other words, this survey allows comparison
of state legislator ideology regardless of the chamber or year in which the legislator
serves. Additionally, these scores are directly comparable to measures of ideology in
Congress. Because these measures of polarization are comparable across time and leg-
3Specically, these scholars estimated a multi-dimensional Bayesian Item-Response
Theory model. For more on this, see Jackman (2001).
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islative chamber. I make use of the House Dierence and Senate Dierence variables
contained in the Correlates data set. These measures of ideology are available from
1994 until 2012.
5.2.2 Partisanship and Ideology in the Electorate
When considering a model of voter turnout, it is necessary to account for the state
or the congressional district's partisan and ideological proclivities. Fortunately, the
Correlates dataset contains such measures. Erikson et al. (1993) used public opinion
surveys to estimate both state-level partisanship and ideology. Because public opinion
surveys have show to be reliable estimates of these two concepts, I make use of these
two variables.
The party variable contained in the Correlates dataset is a yearly measure that
compares the number of Democrats to the number of Republicans in each each state.
The measure is calculated by subtracting the number of Republican identiers from
the number of Democratic identiers. A positive score indicates that the state has a
more Democratic electorate, and a negative score indicates that a state has a more
Republican electorate.
The ideology variable contained in the Correlates dataset is nearly identical to
the partisanship variable. It compares the number of liberals to the number of con-
servatives in each state. This measure is calculated by subtracting the number of
Conservatives from the number of Liberals in each state. A positive score indicates
that the state has a more liberal electorate, and negative score indicates that a state
as a more conservative electorate. Both the partisanship variables are available for
years 1976 - 2011.
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5.2.3 Control Variables
In addition to polarization, partisanship, and ideology, I include three additional
control variables. Of which, the control for state electoral competitiveness is probably
the most important. I make use the 4 year moving average of percentage of safe
seats as a control for electoral competitiveness.4 According to this measure a seat is
considered safe if it typically wins by a margin of 10% or greater.
At the individual-level, voters with higher levels of education are more likely to
vote. This nding should hold in the aggregate as well. States that have better ed-
ucation systems should have dierent levels of voter turnout than do states that do
not. Fortunately, the Correlates dataset has a variety of education variables. However,
many of these variables do not mesh well with the time span necessary to conduct
the analyses of voter turnout. As a proxy for state education level, I use the average
daily school attendance rate for each state. This data was collected by the National
Center for Education Statistics, and it is available from the early 1970s until 2009.
As with higher education levels, income levels also matter at the individual-level.
This nding should hold in the aggregate as well. States that have higher levels of
income should also have dierent rates of voter turnout than do states with lower
levels of income. I measure state income levels as total personal income in 1000s of
dollars. This measure is also available from the early 1970s until 2010.
5.2.4 Missing Data
As with any dataset that amalgamates information from multiple sources, the
Correlates data set has various levels of missingness among many of its constituent
parts. The VEP measure of voter turnout and the measures of ideology and party are
4This measure was rst proposed by Austin Ranney and later updated by Klarner
(2013).
99
the only variables in the analyses that do not have any missing data. However, the two
polarization variables have relatively high levels of missingness. This is largely due to
states not consistently reporting the voting scores of members of their legislatures.
Most of the missingness comes form the middle years of the 1990s. There is some
missing data on the control variables, but they are relatively low.
The large issue is that these disparate data sources are from projects that began at
dierent time periods. The selected predictor variables from the Correlates data set {
polarization, party, ideology, education, income, and electoral competition { truncate
the the full range of the voter turnout time series. The nal data frame that I used
here spans from 1994 - 2008. I handle the missing data contained in the Correlates
dataset by performing complete case analyses in the forthcoming sections.
5.3 Modeling Macro-level Voter Turnout
In this section, I present a series of regression models to analyze the relationship
between voter turnout and polarization. Because the VEP measure of turnout is a
normally distributed, continuous variable, a linear model will perform exceptionally
well to uncover the eect that polarization has on voter turnout.
The nature of these analyses allows an over-time comparison of voter turnout
for each state. In other words, these analyses operate within the time-series cross-
sectional framework. In order to facilitate the over time comparisons, I estimated a
series of linear regression models with xed eects.5
Table 5.1 reports a series of linear regression models that uncovers the relationship
between polarization and voter turnout with the party identication of the state as
5The term xed eect means dierent things for dierent disciplines. By xed ef-
fects, I mean allowing the intercept to vary across dierent time periods. I accomplish
this feat by including dummy variable for the 1996 to 2008 elections. The 1994 election
is withheld as the reference category.
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a predictor. Model 1 considers how Senate polarization aects voter turnout. Model
2 substitutes House polarization for Senate polarization, and Model 3 includes both
as predictors. Including both chambers as measures as predictors of polarization may
be a source of concern for some scholars. However, a test for variance ination factors
suggests that multicolinearity is not a concern for this model. The variance ination
factors for both polarization terms are both approximately 3.60.
Model 1 suggests that Senate polarization is statistically signicant and positively
related to voter turnout. A one-unit increase in the Senate Polarization variable pro-
duces a 0.03 increase in voter turnout rate when considering the eects of the other
predictors. However, this model suggests that state-level partisanship is unrelated to
voter turnout because the coecient is not statistically signicant.
Model 2 suggests that House polarization is a statistically signicant predictor
of voter turnout. As with the previous model, House polarization is also positively
related to voter turnout. This models suggests that when the control variables are
held constant, a one-unit increase in the polarization variable produces a 0.06 increase
in the voter turnout variable, all else equal. In contrast to the rst model, state-level
partisanship does seem to matter when considering the eect of House polarization.
The models suggest that more Democratic electorates are more likely vote vote than
are Republican electorates when House polarization is held at its mean value.
Model 3 considers the eect of both Senate and House polarization. However only
House polarization term is statistically signicant. The coecients in this model are
largely the same as they are in the second model. In terms of explained variance,
Model 3 is no improvement over the rst two models which can be seen through the
nearly identical Adjusted R-square values of each model. Considering this nding, I
suggest that when considering the eects of polarization on voter turnout with party
as a control variable either House or Senate polarization can be used as a measure of
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Table 5.1: Polarization and Party as Predictors of Voter Turnout
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 0:80 0:80 0:81
(0:13) (0:13) (0:13)
Party 0:03 0:06 0:06
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03)
Senate Polarization 0:03 0:00
(0:01) (0:01)
House Polarization 0:05 0:05
(0:01) (0:01)
Personal Income  0:00  0:00  0:00
(0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
School Attendance  0:00  0:00  0:00
(0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
Percent Safe  0:00  0:00  0:00
(0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
1996 0:11 0:11 0:11
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03)
1998  0:02  0:01  0:02
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03)
2000 0:14 0:15 0:14
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03)
2002 0:01 0:02 0:01
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03)
2004 0:20 0:21 0:20
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03)
2006 0:02 0:02 0:02
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03)
2008 0:21 0:22 0:21
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03)
N 350 345 343
R2 0:71 0:72 0:72
adj. R2 0:70 0:71 0:71
Resid. sd 0:06 0:06 0:06
Standard errors in parentheses
 indicates signicance at p < 0:05
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polarization, but including both predictors in the model provides no real additional
explanatory power. Because a more parsimonious statistical model is always preferable
to explain political behavior, I turn my attention to the predictions for the rst model
of voter turnout.
Figure 5.1 shows the predicted voter turnout rate from Model 1 when Senate
polarization is held at its minimum value, mean value, and maximum value. All other
predictors are held at their mean value. The model suggests that when comparing
the minimum value of polarization to the maximum value of polarization the voter
turnout rate increases by about 0.10 for both presidential election years and non-
presidential election years.
For instance, during the 2000 election, states with low Senate polarization had
predicted voter turnout rate of 0.53. States that display a mean level of Senate polar-
ization had a predicted voter turnout rate of 0.57, and states that have a maximum
level of Senate polarization had a predicted turnout rate of 0.63, all else equal. A 0.10
increase in turnout is both statistically signicant and substantive important.
The trend holds for non-presidential years as well. During the 2006 election, the
models suggests that states with the minimum level of Senate polarization have 0.41
predicted turnout rate, and a state with a mean level of Senate polarization has a
0.45 predicted voter turnout rate. Whereas a state with the maximum level of Senate
polarization has a 0.51 predicted turnout rate.
Table 5.2 reports a series of linear regression models that considers the relationship
between polarization and voter turnout with the ideology of the state included as a
predictor. Model 4 only considers the eect of Senate polarization on voter turnout.
The model suggests that Senate polarization is signicantly and positively related to
voter turnout. For example, a one unit increase in the Senate polarization variable
produces a 0.03 increase in the voter turnout rate, ceteris paribus. Additionally, the
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Figure 5.1: Predicted Voter Turnout By Polarization Level Considering Party
model suggests that more liberal states will have higher turnout than will a conser-
vative rate when considering other relevant predictors are held at their mean value.
Model 5 replaces the Senate polarization variable with House polarization, but
the eect of the new polarization variable is essentially the same as the previous one.
A one-unit increase in the House polarization variable produces a 0.04 increase in the
voter turnout rate. This model also suggest that more liberal states will have greater
turnout rates than will conservative states when other variables are held constant at
their mean value.
Model 6 considers the eect of both Senate polarization and House polarization
on voter turnout rate with ideology included as a predictor variable. However, only
House polarization is statistically signicant in this model. The coecient, again, sug-
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Table 5.2: Polarization and Ideology as Predictors of Voter Turnout
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 0:84 0:84 0:60
(0:13) (0:12) (0:05)
Ideology 0:15 0:15 0:14
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03)
Senate Polarization 0:03 0:00
(0:01) (0:01)
House Polarization 0:04 0:04
(0:01) (0:01)
Personal Income  0:00  0:00  0:00
(0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
Attendance  0:00  0:00
(0:00) (0:00)
Percent Safe  0:00  0:00  0:00
(0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
1996 0:11 0:11 0:11
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03)
1998  0:02  0:02  0:02
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03)
2000 0:13 0:14 0:14
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03)
2002  0:00 0:00 0:00
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03)
2004 0:20 0:20 0:20
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03)
2006 0:01 0:02 0:02
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03)
2008 0:21 0:22 0:21
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03)
2010 0:03
(0:03)
N 350 345 373
R2 0:73 0:74 0:74
adj. R2 0:72 0:73 0:73
Resid. sd 0:06 0:06 0:06
Standard errors in parentheses
 indicates signicance at p < 0:05
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gests that polarization is positively related to vote choice. The positive coecient
for ideology suggests that more liberal states have higher levels of turnout than do
conservative states when other predictors are held constant at their mean value.
As with the other set of voter turnout models, a more parsimonious model is
preferable to a more complicated one. Because Models 4 through 6 all roughly explain
the same amount of variance in voter turnout (based on the Adjusted R2 value), I rely
on the predictions of Model 4 to better understand how polarization explains voter
turnout. Figure 5.2 displays the predictions from Model 4. As with the predictions
from Model 1, Senate polarization was held at its minimum value, mean value, and
maximum value. All of the other predictors were held at their means. In the end,
these predictions are very similar to Model 1.
For example during the 2000 election, a state with low Senate polarization had a
0.56 predicted turnout rate. A state with a medium amount of Senate polarization
had 0.60 predicted turnout rate, and a state with a high amount of Senate polarization
had a 0.65 predicted voter turnout rate. A 0.09 change in the predicted turnout rate
is both statistically signicant and substantively meaningful.
As with the predictions for Model 1, this trend also holds for non-presidential
election years. In 2006, a state with a low level of Senate polarization had a 0.44
predicted voter turnout rate. A state with a medium amount of Senate polarization
had a 0.48 predicted voter turnout rate, and a state with a high level of Senate
polarization has a 0.53 voter turnout rate when other important variables are held
constant at their mean value.
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Figure 5.2: Predicted Voter Turnout By Polarization Level Considering Ideology
5.4 Summary
The results in this chapter show that polarization is an important predictor of
voter turnout. States that have high polarization compared to low polarization have
a 0.10 greater predicted turnout rate. The models perform equally well regardless of
whether Senate polarization or House polarization is included as a predictor. Addi-
tionally, the partisan and ideological tendencies of the electorate seem to matter as
well. Electorates that identify as more Democratic or more liberal both have a higher
predicted voter turnout rate than states who have a more Republican or conservative
electorate.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSION
The analyses in the previous chapters have demonstrated that polarization is an
important factor that inuences voter turnout at both the individual and aggregate
levels. In this section, I provide a discussion of the ndings from the three empirical
chapters, and I oer some suggestions for future research.
The chapter that presented evidence of polarization arrived at one basic but im-
portant conclusion: Political elites are very polarized, but the American electorate is
much less so. Despite the fact that voters are less polarized than legislators, the public
still has sorted into like-minded groups. This feature of the electorate is undeniably
due to the behavior of political elites. As members of Congress and legislators in our
statehouses have become more polarized, the public has picked up on those division,
and it is now reected in the policy preferences of voters. This feature is largely seen
in the Basic Space Scaling models of issue preferences.
The survey based analyses show many interesting things about polarization and
congressional elections. However, the most important thing to take away from the
analyses is that polarization aects voters dierently depending on the type of po-
litical behavior under consideration. For starters, polarization seems to aect voters
dierently based on their partisan identication. In most instances found the anal-
yses, strong partisans behaved dierently in the context of a highly polarized party
system than did voters who identify as Independent partisans, which was largely seen
in the aective evaluations and vote choice analyses.
Independents evaluated Republicans and Democrats similarly in terms of aect
under the no polarization condition as they did under the high polarization condition.
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This nding meshes well with what we know about voters who identify as Indepen-
dents. They have less attachment to political parties, so it is perfectly understandable
that they are unmoved by polarization in their evaluations of the party system.
By contrast, strong partisans are very much inuenced by polarization when it
comes to aective evaluations of the party system. Polarization signicantly increases
positive evaluations of their own party, and it decreases positive evaluations of the
opposition party. In each of the models, strong partisan evaluations moved to the
maximum value of the aect scale under high polarization when they were asked to
evaluate their party, and strong partisan evaluations moved to the minimum value
of aect when they were asked to evaluate the opposition party. This nding also
meshes well with what we know about strong partisans. They display a very high
level of attachment to their party label, and they vehemently oppose the candidates
and policies of the opposition, which leads to negative aective evaluations. Strong
partisans are the most likely type of voter to pay attention to political campaigns,
which is why they are the group most aected by elite discourse when it comes to
aective evaluations of the party system.
In terms of vote choice, polarization seemed to drastically inuence the vote choice
of pure Independents. This can be seen by the changing pattern among pure Inde-
pendents from the 2012 to the 1992 election. In the former election, they were more
likely to prefer the Democratic candidate. However, in the other election, voters who
identied as pure Independents were more likely to vote for the Republican candidate.
This change in vote preference can be explained by two things.
First, the context of the election may matter greatly for Independent voters.
Things such as majority party performance, candidate approval ratings, the state
of the economy, or other extraneous current events may have a larger inuence on
pure independent vote choice. Second, the inuence of elite discourse should matter
109
more for pure Independents than it should for other types of voters. While strong par-
tisans are the most likely to receive the information contained from elite discourse,
pure Independents are the most likely to have their behavior altered from elite dis-
course that emanates from a highly polarized election. This coupled with the context
of the election explains why an Independent voter could have their party preference
change from election to election.
Among Independents who lean toward one of the major parties, the vote choice
model suggests that these types of voters display similar { but certainly not identical
{ behavior to the strong partisans when it comes to polarization and vote choice. In
2012, Democratic leaning Independents saw a signicant, positive change in voting for
the Democratic Senate candidate, but Republican leaning Independents saw very little
change in the probability of voting for the Democratic candidate. However, the results
were completely opposite during the 1992 election: Republican leaning Independents
saw a signicant, positive change in voting for the Republican candidate, but the vote
choice among Democratic leaning Independents was largely unchanged. This result
suggests that Independents who lean to one particular party are less inuenced by
the context of the election, and they are less likely to be swayed by the information
that comes from political elites of the opposing party.
The analyses pertaining to aective evaluation and vote choice illustrate how
polarization aect voters dierently. However, the analyses for party salience and voter
turnout show that polarization can invoke a similar response among dierent types of
voter. For instance, the party salience models suggest that polarization increases the
probability that voters will have something to say about each of the respective parties.
In each of the 1992 salience models, Republicans, Independents, and Democrats had
similar rates of change in the number of comments provided in their post-election
interviews as polarization moved from its minimum to maximum value. Additionally,
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each of these party salience models nearly converged at the same probability of never
providing a comment about either of the parties.
These result suggest that polarization can and does increase the number of com-
ments that voters have about each of the parties. In this sense political information
from elites only causes voters to provide an evaluation of what they see or hear.
In this case, there should be no dierence in the number of comments that voters
provide. As polarization increases, voters are more likely to voice their opinion. One
drawback of these analyses is that they do not have a directional component to com-
ments. In other words, we don't know whether the number of comments are positive
or negative. However, based on the results found in some of the other analyses of this
chapter, I would hypothesize that the number of positive comments would increase
for like-minded partisans and their associated leaning independents, and they would
decrease for opposition partisans and opposition leaning independents.
Finally, the voter turnout analyses suggest that polarization increases the proba-
bility of voting for all types of partisans, age groups, and education levels. I initially
expected that the greatest amount of change in the probability of voting would come
from Independents because they the most room for movement in their probability of
voting. However, the strong partisans moved at an equal rate even though they are
already the most likely to vote. Strong partisans are already predisposed to casting
a vote, but the fact that they displayed as much change as the Independents under
a highly polarized shows the power that elite discourse can have on the decision to
vote.
The results in the aggregate chapter show that polarization has the propensity to
drastically increase voter turnout rates at the state-level. States with higher levels of
polarization displayed had higher predicted rates of voter turnout than did states with
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lower levels of polarization. This is encouraging because it shows that polarization
can have a positive impact on the electorate.
In the end I feel that this project was mostly successful. The evidence of polariza-
tion chapter clearly showed that legislators are polarized. It is doubtful that further
research would cast doubt on this conclusion. However, further advancement in the
eld could help scholars address whether partisanship or ideology is ultimate cause
of polarization at the elite-level.
As far as evidence of polarization for voters, further research could benet from
a few small tweaks. First, researchers could collect more data to see if the electorate
is polarized. So far, scholars have primarily relied on the ANES as their main source
of data about voters. Other surveys such as the Cooperative Congressional Election
Survey could prove useful in this endeavor. Additionally, the ANES has a limited
amount of questions that are asked in a consistent way over time. This make over
time comparisons somewhat dicult. Researchers could start asking questions more
consistently over time. Finally, surveying the same individuals over time could prove
useful.
Turning to the individual-level analyses of voter turnout and polarization, it may
be useful for other scholars to move outside of the survey framework. Experiments and
social network analyses could prove useful for understanding how voters incorporate
information from political elites.
I think that the most room for improvement could come from the aggregate anal-
yses. This project would certainly be aided by having a longer time frame with which
to work. The roll-call voting records at the state-level have made considerable strides
thanks to the work of Shor and McCarty. However, it would be nice to have records
that go farther back in time. The same is true for the VEP time series.
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In conclusion, many observers of American politics have postulated that polariza-
tion is bad for democracy. However, I have gone to great lengths to show that not
every aspect of polarization is negative. A continual theme found in this dissertation
is that polarization produces greater turnout.
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